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COMMENTS
The Department of Defense DNA Repository:
Practical Analysis of the Government's
Interest and the Potential for Genetic
Discrimination
ELIZABETH REITERt
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.
-Hon. Louis D. Brandeis'
t J.D. candidate, May 1999, State University of New York at Buffalo; B.A.,
1993, St. Bonaventure University. This work is dedicated to the memory of my
mother, Kathleen Jermyn Reiter, who passed away on March 2, 1997 as a result
of breast cancer. I sincerely hope that greater protections against genetic
discrimination are implemented in the future so that individuals who have a
history of genetic disease within their family will not avoid genetic testing due
to fear of repercussions in the workplace.
I wish to thank Lee Albert, Diane Avery, and David Filvaroff for providing
guidance on this Comment. I also appreciate the endless support and
encouragement provided to me by my father, sister, and friends throughout the
course of working on this project. Finally, but for the suggestion of Carolyn
Fiume and Nodlle Kowalsky, I never would have been introduced to the
Department of Defense's mandatory DNA collection policy.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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I asked, what else will [my DNA] by used for, who else is going to
have access to it, and how long are you going to keep it?... All the
answers were "We don't know."
-John Christian Mayfield III2
INTRODUCTION
John Christian Mayfield and Joseph Vlacovsky became
what some have referred to as the "first DNA conscientious
objectors" when they refused to surrender DNA samples to
the military on January 24, 1995.3 On that date, Lance Cpl.
Mayfield and Cpl. Vlacovsky reported to their battalion's
aid station to undergo what they thought would be a
standard physical examination in preparation for an
upcoming eleven month deployment.4 However, the workers
at the clinic presented the marines with an unexpected new
request-that they provide blood and saliva samples for
DNA testing.5 Mayfield and Vlacovsky were hesitant.6 When
they inquired as to how these specimens were going to be
used, none of the technicians knew the answer.! The two
marines left without providing the requested samples.8
Mayfield and Vlacovsky were unaware that in 1991 the
United States Department of Defense (DoD) had
established a policy of mandatory DNA collection from all
service members for the purpose of identifying the remains
of service members.9 The DoD implemented this program by
collecting DNA specimens from military personnel who, like
Mayfield and Vlacovsky, were preparing for operational
deployment, as well as those personnel enlisting or
2. Dean Chadwin, The DNA War: How Two Marines Fought the Military's
Genetic Roundup, THE VILLAGE VOICE (New York, N.Y.), May 14, 1996, at 23.
John Mayfield was describing the events which took place before he and a
fellow service member disobeyed a lawful written order demanding that they
provide samples of their DNA for the Department of Defense DNA Repository.
Id.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 23; Robert Craig Scherer, Mandatory Genetic Dogtags and the
Fourth Amendment: The Need for a New Post-Skinner Test, 85 GEORGETOWN
L.J. 2007 (1997).
6. See Chadwin, supra note 2, at 23.
7. See id.; Scherer, supra note 5, at 2007.
8. See Chadwin, supra note 2, at 23.
9. Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300, 302 (D. Haw. 1995), vacated, 109
F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1997).
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reenlisting in the armed forces.1" Mayfield and Vlacovsky
refused to provide their DNA samples to the military
because they were concerned that someone could access the
information and use such information for adverse
purposes." The marines were punished for disobeying a
lawful written order of a commanding officer. 2
Subsequently, they brought a civil suit in the District Court
of Hawaii to challenge the military's mandatory DNA
collection policy,13 and appealed to the Ninth Circuit when
the district court decided in favor of the government. 4
The marines' objection to providing DNA samples was
based on the fact that DNA contains information which
could be used to predict whether an individual is likely to
develop a genetically-linked disease. 5 Such information is
accessible due in large part to the Human Genome Project,
an international project with the ultimate goal of
identifying all of the three billion bases in the human
genome by 2005.16 The project is of enormous scope,
considering that every individual's DNA sequence contains
as much information as one thousand thousand-page phone
books.'7  However, some have predicted that, when
completed, the project will provide "the ultimate tool for
understanding ourselves at the molecular level,"8 and that,
as a result, it will be "the first time in 10,000 years of
civilization that humans have had the capacity to upgrade
their quality of life."9
As genetic structure is explored, individuals gain the
10. See id. at 304.
11. See id.
12. See Sarah Gill, The Military's DNA Registry: An Analysis of Current Law
and a Proposal for Safeguards, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 179, 190-91 (1997).
13. See Mayfield, 901 F. Supp. at 300; GREGORY L. SIMMONS, COMPULSORY
DNA SAMPLING OF SERVICE MEMBERS FOR INCLUSION IN THE DOD DNA REGISTRY:
REMAINS IDENTIFICATION WITH A RISK 31 (1996).
14. See Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1997).
15. See generally John Carey et al., The Biotech Century, BUSINESS WEEK,
Mar. 10, 1997, at 78.
16. See Advances in Genetics Research and Technologies: Challenges for
Public Policy: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, 104th Cong. 46 (1996) (testimony of Francis S. Collins, M.D.).
17. See Walter Gilbert, A Vision of the Grail, in THE CODE OF CODES:
SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 84 (Daniel J.
Kevles & Leroy Hood, eds. 1992).
18. L. Jaroff, The Gene Hunt, TIME, Mar. 20, 1989, at 63.
19. GEORGE J. ANNAS & SHERMAN ELIAS, GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND
ETHICS AS GUIDES 47 (1992).
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ability to read the human genome, note genetic defects or
discrepancies, and predict who is likely to develop
genetically-linked disease. ° Individuals who are likely to
develop certain diseases can take preventative measures
that will minimize environmental factors which could
promote the onset of disease.21 In addition, scientists are
exploring "gene therapy," a new treatment which may
permanently prevent the onset of genetically-linked
diseases."
Although the Human Genome Project offers many
benefits, the technology involved also creates new
opportunities for abuse or discrimination. Many individuals
fear that they could be denied health insurance, life
insurance, or employment because of unfavorable results on
a genetic test." Since few legal remedies against genetic
discrimination exist, these fears may be justified.
This Comment explores the DoD's mandatory DNA
collection policy in an effort to determine whether the
government needed to implement such a policy and whether
the marines' fears of genetic discrimination were
reasonable. Part I examines the scientific process of DNA
testing and describes the information that may be obtained
through this testing. Part II discusses the Department of
Defense DNA Repository and the case which arose when
John Mayfield and Joseph Vlacovsky refused provide
samples for the DNA Repository. Specifically, Part II
scrutinizes the district court's determination that the
government's interest in the identification of human
remains was more compelling than the marines' privacy
interest in their DNA. Part III analyzes the extent of the
government's interest in maintaining a DNA Repository,
concluding that the government's interests in perpetuating
20. See generally Carey et al., supra note 15, at 78.
21. Francis S. Collins et al., Variations on a Theme: Cataloging Human
DNA Sequence Variation, SCIENCE, Nov. 28, 1997, at 34; Clive Cookson &
Daniel Green, Genetic Research Gathers Steam: The Study of DNA Structure
and the Process of Changing Mutated Genes is no Longer the Stuff of Science
Fiction, FIN. POST, Nov. 5, 1997, at A5.
22. Mark D. Somerson, Effective Gene Therapy Doesn't Come Instantly,
COLUMBuS DISPATCH (Ohio), Feb. 8, 1998, at 7B.
23. See Rick Weiss, Clinton to Support Legislation Guarding Against Gene-
Test Bias; Inherited Risk for Disease Has Kept Some from Getting Insurance,
WASH. POST, July 14, 1997, at A8; Robin Marantz Henig, Tricky Truths about
Ethnicity and Genetics, WASH. POST, Oct. 5. 1997, at C01; see also infra notes
167-88 (discussing examples of genetic discrimination in the workplace).
978 [Vol. 47
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
its DNA collection policy are not compelling. Part IV
discusses the likelihood that a service member who provides
DNA samples to the repository will be subjected to genetic
discrimination by future employers or by the military itself.
This Comment concludes that the government's interest in
collecting and storing the DNA of all of its service members
is not as compelling as portrayed by the government in for
the following reasons: (1) during peacetime, the chance that
any service member must be identified is extremely low; (2)
based upon the U.S. military's experience identifying the
remains of 388 service members during the Gulf War, the
military's need to identify bodily remains during hostile
conflicts through the use of DNA analysis is very low; (3)
DNA identification of remains during hostile conflicts is not
a foolproof method of identification due to the unpredictable
environmental conditions on a battlefield; and (4) DNA
identification may be undertaken without the convenience
of a DNA Repository by using DNA donated by the family
members of unidentified service members. This Comment
concludes that the U.S. military has the power and the
right to use the information in the DNA Repository to
engage in genetic discrimination against its own service
members, provided that such action is deemed a "military
necessity." Furthermore, this same potential for genetic
discrimination could exist in the private sector in any one of
the thirty-six states which have no laws preventing genetic
discrimination if the DoD stores this genetic information
electronically. Unless these potential prob-lems are
addressed, the DOD will be allowed to maintain a policy
which could potentially expose any number of service
members to genetic discrimination.
I. DNA TESTING
A. The Science of DNA Testing
With the exception of red blood cells, every single cell in
the human body contains deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in its
nucleus. 4 DNA is a six-foot long strand of chemical sub-
24. See Sally E. Renskers, Comment, Trial By Certainty: Implications of
Genetic DNA Fingerprints, 39 EMORY L.J. 309, 311 (1990); Janet C. Hoeffel,
Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the
97919991
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units which encodes information concerning cell structure
and function.25  Essentially, the genetic information
contained within every cell of the human body is identical,"
and any single strand of DNA may provide a "complete
genetic 'blueprint' for all of an individual's physical traits."27
DNA is a static material which will typically not change or
grow throughout the course of a person's life.28
A DNA strand resembles a double helix. Along the
length of the DNA strand, molecules called nucleotide bases
pair up with one another. ° These nucleotide bases are
organized into coding regions, or genes,"' which consist
simply of assorted nucleotide base pair sequences. 2 Each
gene holds the genetic code for one particular feature,
structure, or function of the human body.3
Out of the approximately three billion base pairs in
each DNA molecule, an estimated three million pairs-
known as polymorphisms-are truly unique to an
individual.34 In order to identify a person on the basis of his
or her DNA, DNA profiling techniques focus on highly
polymorphic sections of DNA."
The two most well-known tests used for the purposes of
DNA identification are RFLP analysis ("restriction
fragment length polymorphism" analysis) and PCR analysis
Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465, 469 (1990).
25. See Dan L. Burk & Jennifer A. Hess, Genetic Privacy: Constitutional
Considerations in Forensic DNA Testing, 5 GEo. MASON U. CIrv. RTS. L.J. 1, 3
(1995); Hoeffel, supra note 24, at 469.
26. See Hoeffel, supra note 24, at 470.
27. Burk & Hess, supra note 25, at 4.
28. See Hoeffel, supra note 24, at 470. Although DNA itself is typically
static, it may be altered or be caused to mutate by exposure to certain adverse
conditions. See infra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
29. See Renskers, supra note 24, at 312.
30. See id.; Hoeffel, supra note 24, at 470.
31. See DAVID T. SUZUKI ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ANALYSIS 578
(3d ed. 1986).
32. See Hoeffel, supra note 24, at 470.
33. See id.
34. See id. Biologically, human beings are very similar in organic structure.
For example humans have two arms and two legs, but only one nose. As one
might therefore expect, more human genes are similar than different. See id.;
see also FBI DNA Fingerprinting: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2
(1989).
35. See Alec. J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable "Minisatellite" Regions in
Human DNA, 314 NATURE 67 (1985).
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("polymerase chain reaction" analysis). RFLP analysis
involves breaking down the DNA into fragments,
hypervariable minisatellite regions, which consist solely of
polymorphisms.36 These fragments are then sorted by size to
reveal a RFLP banding pattern which is highly
characteristic of an individual.
On the other hand, PCR analysis uses a radioactive
DNA probe to examine sections of DNA and search for a
particular sequence of nucleotides." This test does not
separate the DNA strand into segments, as the RFLP test
does.39 Instead, the test searches the DNA strand for a
particular sequence at the probe point. ° In order to search
more thoroughly for the sequence in question, the probe
checks for the sequence in various sections of the DNA
strand.4 Despite efforts to increase reliability of the PCR
testing, the test is still somewhat less reliable than RFLP
analysis, since the chances of a coincidental match are
higher.42 One advantage of PCR testing lies in the fact that
it may be applied to a small amount of DNA or DNA that is
in a degraded form.
4 3
B. The Human Genome Project
The Human Genome Project (HGP) is an international
project launched in 1991 with the purpose of analyzing the
molecular structure of human chromosomes." This purpose
is carried out through gene identification, mapping, and
36. See Renskers, supra note 24, at 312; Hoeffel, supra note 24, at 472;
Jeffreys et al., supra note 35.
37. See Burk & Hess, supra note 25, at 4-6.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See LEGIS. COMM'N ON SC. AND TECH., Forensic DNA Analysis, LCST
Report No. 90-1, at 6 (N.Y. 1990) [hereinafter Comm'n of 1990].
43. See Comm'n of 1990, supra note 42, at 6. See also Burk & Hess, supra
note 25, at 6.
44. See LEGIS. CoMM'N ON SCI. AND TECH., DNA-Based Tests: Policy
Implications for New York State, LCST Report No. 94-1, at 5 (N.Y. 1994)
[hereinafter Comm'n of 1994]; Preventing Genetic Discrimination in Health
Insurance: Hearings Before the House Commerce Committee Task Force on
Health Records and Genetic Privacy, 105th Cong. 53 (1997) [hereinafter
Preventing Genetic Discrimination].
45. Gene mapping is the process of pinpointing the location of a gene on a
chromosome. See Comm'n of 1994, supra note 44, at 6.
1999] 981
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sequencing.46 The project's organizers divided the project
into three segments. First, scientists are creating a detailed
physical map for the human genome by dividing DNA into
smaller fragments.47 Scientists hope to use the physical map
to identify patterns of heredity among humans as well as
sites on the DNA strand connected to disease.48 When
completed, this map will serve as a source for pinpointing
the location of genes related to various diseases.49 Second,
project participants seek to determine the sequence of all
nucleotide base pairs in every chromosome."0 Scientists are
striving to sequence all of the DNA in the human genome
by 2005."' The final leg of the project, fully understanding
all of the genes, shall keep researchers in the field of
biogenetics busy for many years to come.52
In the United States alone, Congress appropriated the
HGP three billion dollars through the year 2006.53 The fact
that such a large sum was assigned to this project
emphasizes the importance placed on the project's
anticipated results-insights into many diseases which
have genetic indicators.54 Once the order of the three billion
human DNA bases has been revealed, scientists will begin
to unlock how the nucleotide bases function and interact
with one another.55 They hope to catalog sets of genes that
46. Sequencing involves determining the order of the nucleotide bases on a
DNA strand. See id.
47. See Gilbert, supra note 17, at 85.
48. See id.
49. See id. Genes related to disease have already been discovered. For
example, in 1994, scientists discovered BRCA1, a gene related to the
development of breast cancer. See Nicholas Wade, Scientists Discover Role of 2
Genes in Breast Cancer, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), Apr. 24, 1997, at A4.
In 1995, an additional breast cancer gene was found, BRCA2. People who have
a flawed copy of either gene can have a greater than eighty-five percent chance
of developing breast cancer. See id. More recently, in August of 1997, scientists
at the National Institutes of Health announced that they had found another
gene related to breast cancer, AlBI. See Breast Cancer: Scientists Discover Gene
Linked to Growth of Disease, CHI. TRrB., Aug. 18, 1997, at A12.
50. See Gilbert, supra note 17, at 85.
51. See Preventing Genetic Discrimination, supra note 44; Joyce Lain
Kennedy, Genetic Testing in the Workplace Holds Potential for Discrimination,
BUFF. NEwS, Aug. 23, 1997, at A13.
52. See Gilbert, supra note 17, at 85.
53. See Comm'n of 1994, supra note 44, at 6.
54. See id.
55. See id.
982 [Vol. 47
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
generally affect how the body grows or fails to fumction.56 It
is expected that new technologies will allow scientists to
reveal the secrets of disease susceptibility57 by determining
which genes are related to heart disease, cancer
susceptibility, high blood pressure, schizophrenia,
Alzheimer's disease susceptibility, and manic-depressive
illness, among many other conditions.58 After disease-linked
genes are detected, scientists will develop DNA-based
analysis to identify people who possess these genes and
scientists will concentrate on developing treatments to
target such diseases.59
Furthermore, some researchers hope that the results of
the HGP will allow humans to arrive at a new level of
understanding about themselves and how their bodies
function. Walter Gilbert, a scientist who decoded one of the
first DNA regions in 1971, aptly expressed this idea:
We will understand deeply how we are assembled, dictated by our
genetic information. Part of that understanding is, of course, to
realize that genetic information does not dictate everything about
us. We are not slaves of that information .... But society will have
to wrestle with the question of how much of our makeup is
dictated by the environment, and how much is dictated by our
genetics, and how much is dictated by our own will and
determination.60
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF AND OBJECTION TO THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE DNA REPOSITORY
In 1991, the DoD began using DNA testing to identify
soldiers' remains in cases where traditional identification
sources such as fingerprints or dental records would be
inadequate.6 ' The DoD claimed that this program would
remedy DNA identification problems it experienced during
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. New genes associated with disease are discovered weekly. At
present there are genetic tests to identify approximately 450 genetic disorders.
More of these tests are expected to be developed in the future. See Preventing
Genetic Discrimination, supra note 44.
59. See Gilbert, supra note 17, at 95.
60. Gilbert, supra note 17, at 96.
61. See Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300, 302 (D. Haw. 1995), vacated,
109 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1997).
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the Gulf War.62 By December 1991, the DoD established a
program to collect DNA samples from every service member
on active duty or in the reserve armed forces and store
them in the DoD DNA Repository.63 By November 1996, the
Repository contained more than one million specimens. 4
The DoD anticipates that the DNA Repository will contain
the specimens of all military personnel by 2001," indicating
that the DoD will collect more than 2.5 million additional
specimens."
At present, the DoD gathers blood and cheek cell
samples from every service member and stores them for
fifty years at the Repository in Gaithersburg, Maryland. 7
Blood samples are smeared on a card and vacuum-sealed.68
Cheek cell samples are collected on a cotton swab and
soaked in alcohol.69 After assigning an identification
number and bar code to the samples, the DoD stores all of
the samples in refrigerated containers.70 If a service
member completes his or her military service before the
expiration of the fifty year storage period, the service
member may request that the DoD destroy the samples.7'
In January 1995, Lance Cpl. John C. Mayfield III and
Cpl. Joseph Vlacovsky, marines stationed at the Kaneohe
Bay Marine Corps Air Station in Hawaii, were scheduled to
deploy.72 When ordered to provide blood and cheek samples
for the DoD DNA Repository, both marines refused on the
grounds that the DoD had not implemented adequate
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See No Secrets Anymore, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 1, 1996, at A3.
65. See Mayfield, 901 F. Supp. at 302.
66. See SIMMONS, supra note 13, at 35. This estimate was based on the fact
that approximately 2.5 million individuals are in the military each year and
assumes that the turnover rate in the military is 200,000 to 300,000 per year.
Id.
67. See Mayfteld, 901 F. Supp. at 302; Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423,
1426 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Scott Winokur, Genetic Discrimination: Your
DNA Can Hurt You in More Ways Than One, DENY. ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June
30, 1996, at C4; Stephen Goode, Marines Stand Ground Against DNA Testing,
INSIGHT MAG., Feb. 19, 1996, at 38.
68. See Mayfield, 901 F. Supp. at 302.
69. See id.
70. See id.; Mayfield, 109 F.3d at 1426 n.1; see also Winokur, supra note 67,
at C4; Goode, supra note 67, at 14.
71. See Mayfield, 109 F.3d at 1426 n.1. The specimen is destroyed within
180 days of a service member's request. Id.
72. See Mayfield, 901 F. Supp. at 302.
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measures to prevent adverse use of any information
contained in their DNA samples.73 The Marine Corps
charged Mayfield and Vlacovsky with disobeying a lawful
written order from a commanding officer7' and threatened
them with courts martial, prison sentences, and bad-
conduct discharges."
Mayfield and Vlacovsky commenced a civil action,
Mayfield v. Dalton,76 to challenge the military's collection
policy. They argued, among other things, that the military's
collection and storage of DNA specimens violated their
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.77 To determine whether DNA
collection, concededly a seizure, was unreasonable, the
court applied the Skinner balancing test, a standard
commonly relied upon in mandatory drug testing cases.78
Under Skinner, the court weighs the government's interest
in the disputed activity against the privacy interests of the
individuals being affected to ascertain which party has the
greater interest.
The district court granted the Marine Corps' motion for
summary judgment," holding that military collection of
DNA samples, a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, was not "unreasonable."8 The court stated
that the government's interest in collecting DNA samples
was the identification of remains.82 In addition, the court
imputed the interest of service members' next of kin to the
government's side of the equation, emphasizing that family
members would "derive [great] benefit, and solace, from the
speedy and definite identification of the remains of their
loved ones."83  The court stated "the military has
73. Id.; See Goode, supra note 67, at 14.
74. See Gill, supra note 12, at 190.
75. See Goode, supra note 67, at 14.
76. 901 F. Supp. 300 (D. Haw. 1995), vacated, 109 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1997).
77. Because the marines relied primarily on Fourth Amendment arguments
at the district court proceeding, the district court did not respond to the
allegations of other constitutional violations which had been raised. See id. at
303.
78. Id. at 303-04 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602 (1989)); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
79. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
80. See Mayfield, 901 F. Supp. at 306.
81. Id. at 303 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757).
82. See id.
83. Id. at 303-04.
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demonstrated a compelling interest in both its need to
account internally for the fate of its service members and in
ensuring the peace of mind of their next of kin and
dependents in time of war."'
Regarding the marines' privacy rights, the court
concluded that collection of DNA samples was a minimal
intrusion.85 It focused upon the purpose for which the
sample was collected-remains identification-and
observed that tissue collection for remains identification
was "far less intrusive" than the collection of bodily fluids
for use in a criminal prosecution or to detect illegal drug or
alcohol use.86 The court suggested that, although criminal
prosecution or drug testing might limit personal freedom by
imprisonment, DNA identification of human remains serves
the positive goal of accounting for the fates of service
members. 7 Finally, the court noted that even if the privacy
rights of a civilian would have been violated by a
compulsory DNA collection program, the DoD did not
violate Mayfield's and Vlacovsky's privacy rights since the
two men had forfeited some of their freedom by enlisting in
the Marine Corps.88
Having adopted the Skinner test and weighed the
government's interests against that of the marines, the
district court found in favor of the government:
The court finds that the military has demonstrated a compelling
interest in both its need to account internally for the fate of its
service members and in ensuring the peace of mind of their next of
kin and dependents in time of war. The court further finds that
when measured against this interest, the minimal intrusion
presented by the taking of blood samples and oral swabs for the
military's DNA registry, though undoubtedly a "seizure," is not an
unreasonable seizure and is thus not prohibited by the
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 303; see also Skinner v. Railvay Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 604 (1989); Natl Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656;
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
87. See Mayfield, 901 F. Supp. at 304.
88. Id. ("[Certain public employees are necessarily subject to diminished
expectations of privacy... and 'may not only be required to give what in other
contexts might be viewed as extraordinary assurances of trustworthiness and
probity, but also may expect intrusive inquiries into their physical fitness for
those special positions.' "(citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671)).
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Constitution.8 9
The district court refused to consider additional
arguments offered by the marines that the potential future
use of the DNA samples by the military for a purpose other
than the identification of remains would constitute a much
greater privacy intrusion.90 In particular, Mayfield and
Vlacovsky feared that the samples could be used to
diagnose genetically-linked diseases and disorders or could
be accessed by third parties such as potential employers or
insurance agencies. 91 The district court decided that such
arguments did not present a justiciable case or controversy
since no such action had actually been taken by the
military. It concluded that the marines' arguments were
based on a purely hypothetical situation.92
Mayfield and Vlacovsky appealed to the Ninth Circuit.93
However, the two marines were discharged from the Marine
Corps prior to oral argument, and they never provided any
samples to the DoD DNA Registry.94 Accordingly, the circuit
court held that the marines' Fourth Amendment arguments
were moot.95 Mayfield and Vlacovsky argued that there was
still a potential that they would be subjected to the
military's DNA sample regulations since, as members of the
Marine Corps Reserves, they could be required to return to
active duty at some future point.9" However, the Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument. Although there was a
possibility that the pair would be recalled to active duty,
the court declared that recall only would happen "at some
indefinite time in the future and then only upon the
occurrence of future events now unforeseeable." These
conditions were "speculative contingencies" upon which the
court was not willing to base its decision. 8 The Ninth
Circuit held that no exception to the mootness doctrine
could be applied because the marines suffered no "harm
89. Mayfield, 901 F. Supp. at 304.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. (citing Fern v. Turman, 736 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1210 (1985)).
93. See Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1997).
94. See id. at 1425.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 1425.
98. Id. (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 403 (1975)).
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'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'""
Finally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Mayfield and
Vlacovsky's arguments regarding harm which might befall
them in the future were not yet ripe for review.' 0 The court
vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded
the case with instructions to dismiss it as moot.'01
III. IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS AND ENSURING THE PEACE
OF MIND OF NEXT OF KIN AS "COMPELLING" GOVERNMENT
INTERESTS
When the court in Mayfield analyzed the military's
interests regarding the need to account for the fate of
service members and the assurance of peace of mind for
next of kin, the military's interests were deemed
"compelling."' 2 The identification of remains is an admit-
tedly benign activity in which the military must engage, an
activity which Mayfield and Vlacovsky did not challenge.
03
Rather, they objected to the compulsory element of the
DoD's DNA collection for remains identification. 4 Instead
of focusing upon whether the government has a compelling
interest in remains identification in general, the focus
should be upon whether the identification of human
remains through the mandatory collection and storage of
millions of DNA samples is an activity in which the
government has a compelling interest. Investigation of this
issue reveals that the DoD's interest is not nearly as
compelling as it was portrayed in Mayfield.
A. Absence of Conflict
The past twenty years have been relatively peaceful
from a military standpoint, and few service members have
died in combat. From 1979 through September 1996, 558
99. Id. at 1426 (quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498
(1911)).
100. See id. at 1425.
101. See id. at 1427.
102. Mayfield, 901 F. Supp. at 304.
103. See id. The ability of the military to identify the remains of service
members affects whether numerous benefits, such as group life insurance,
veteran's benefits, burial benefits, and survivor's benefits should be paid. See
Gill, supra note 12, at 183.
104. See Mayfield, 901 F. Supp. at 304.
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service members died in hostile engagements,
approximately thirty-five lives lost each year.' Considering
that the average military personnel strength per year was
1,965,181, the number of yearly deaths on average from
combat per 100,000 persons equaled 1.78.06 Thus, based on
these numbers, though any life lost is one too many, the
chance that a service member will be killed in combat
during a time of peace is approximately 1 in 50,000, or
0.002%.
When analyzing the likelihood that Mayfield and
Vlacovsky would be involved in a future conflict, the Ninth
Circuit recognized that the chance of conflict was low:
"[W]hile there is a 'possibility' that a national emergency
might arise, and that the military might choose to recall
Mayfield and Vlacovsky to active duty, the recall could
happen only at some indefinite time in the future and then
only upon the occurrence of future events now
unforeseeable." °7 The court described the potential of future
conflict as a speculative contingency and disregarded the
marines' contention that harm could befall them in the
future.10 8 However, considering the fact that each individual
has only a 0.002% chance of dying if military conditions
remain constant, is not the military's need to compel all
soldiers to provide DNA samples for identifying remains
likewise a speculative contingency? The minimal chance of
casualty from military conflict during peaceful periods does
not demonstrate that mandatory DNA collection is a
compelling governmental interest.
However, the military's interest would become more
compelling if a conflict arose or ff the potentiality of
involvement in a hostile situation became a strong
probability, since the chances of a service member
persisting in a combat situation would increase. However,
this increased risk would only pertain to individuals
involved in the conflict, and would not support the
universal mandatory policy currently employed by the
military. Instead, if a compelling governmental interest
105. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WORLDWIDE U.S. ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY
PERSONNEL CASUALTIES, OCTOBER 1979 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1996, at 7 (1997)
[hereinafter MILITARY PERSONNEL CASUALTIES]. At the time when this comment
was written, information for subsequent years was, as yet, unavailable.
106. See id. at 1.
107. Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423, 1425.
108. See id.
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arose due to a military conflict, then the government could
reasonably require service members exposed to the high-
risk environments to supply a DNA sample.
The military might try to buttress its argument that
mandatory DNA collection is compelling by taking into
account deaths suffered in non-combat conditions because
such non-combat deaths constitute an estimated ninety-
eight percent of military deaths per year.0 9 From 1979 to
1996, the military lost 29,903 service members due to
conditions such as accidents, illnesses, homicides, and self-
inflicted injuries."' The military could argue that such
numbers render remains identification more compelling.
However, when considering non-combat casualties,
deaths resulting from illness or self-inflicted violence
should be excluded from the analysis since the
identification of remains is not ordinarily problematic in
such circumstances. Discussion should instead be limited to
the 19,754 deaths resulting from homicides or accidents, an
average of 1162 casualties per year or 59 deaths per
100,000 service members."' As such, the chance of death by
accident or homicide during peacetime is 0.05%, one-half of
one percent. Although this percentage is considerably
greater than that for casualties in hostile situations, one-
half of one percent may still not give rise to a compelling
governmental interest.
This information raises some interesting questions. If
the military's interest in identifying the remains of
individuals killed in accidents and homicides, based on the
number of deaths in these respective categories, is actually
more compelling than identifying the remains of soldiers
killed in battle, how would the military's interest differ
from the interests of the population as a whole? Does the
government have a compelling interest in identifying the
remains of all civilians murdered or killed in accidents?
Should the government be allowed to seize the DNA of all
citizens based on the fact that any citizen might, at some
time, die in an accident or at the hands of a murderer? Are
murders and accidents not "speculative contingencies"?
Identification of remains of soldiers killed in accidents
or due to homicide is not a purpose which the government
109. See MILITARY PERSONNEL CASUALTIES, supra note 105, at 7.
110. See id.
111. See id.
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articulated in Mayfield. The military's interests established
a mandatory DNA collection program to have a "means of
identifying... remains should [soldiers] be killed in action
with the Marine Corps" and to be "able to confirm which of
its members have fallen in battle, and which ones may have
been taken prisoner or are otherwise unaccounted for.""
2
The military focused on identifying remains "in time of
war,";113 not in time of peace.
In conclusion, collection of DNA from all active duty,
reserve, and National Guard component personnel is a vast
undertaking, especially when one considers the number of
individuals who fall within these categories." When one
compares the number of individuals who comprise this class
in any given year to the number of individuals who might
possibly need to be identified during times of peace, the
disparity between these numbers suggests that the
government's need to collect and store the DNA of every
service member is not as compelling as has been suggested.
B. Continued Necessity of Traditional Means of Remains
Identification
DNA analysis provides the military with "a means of
identifying remains too badly damaged for identification
through dental records or fingerprints.""5 Yet, of the
estimated 0.002% of service members expected to perish in
hostile situations each year during relatively peaceful
times,"6 not every set of remains requires DNA analysis to
establish positive identification. Although the destructive
effects of modern weapons upon the human body might
have raised doubts concerning the continued usefulness of
traditional methods of remains identification such as
fingerprinting, dental radiographs, serological analysis,
112. Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300, 303-04 (D. Haw. 1995), vacated,
109 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1997).
113. Id. at 304.
114. In the 1992 fiscal year, the authorized combined services active duty
personnel strengths equaled 1,886,400. SIMMONS, supra note 13, at 17. In that
same year, the number of authorized reserves was 1,151,046. Id. In 1995, the
number of authorized active duty personnel strengths was 1,525,692, while
authorized reserves equaled 989,247. See id.
115. Mayfield, 901 F. Supp. at 302.
116. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
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medical records, or visual inspection,"7 traditional methods
of remains identification do continue to provide an accurate
method for identification in most cases. In fact, of the 388
deaths which resulted from Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm,"8 only two cases required DNA analysis in
order to complete remains identification-approximately
0.0052%.119 In the other 386 cases, conventional methods of
remains identification were sufficient. 2 ' Fingerprint
analysis alone allowed positive identification in 13% of
these cases, while dental records alone provided 18% of the
positive identifications.' Using a combination of
fingerprint analysis and dental records identified another
63% of the remains.' The final 6% of the identifications
were carried out by using "other" methods, which included
visual identification and the use of information taken from
medical records."2 Thus, traditional methods of remains
identification are still useful to the military for successful
identification of remains and led to the positive
identification in an overwhelming majority of cases from
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 99.9948%.
If in peaceful times an average of 0.002% of service
members perish in conflict, and identification of that
0.002% through DNA analysis is necessary only 0.0052% of
the time, as happened in the Gulf War, the military's need
to collect and store DNA from all service members is even
less compelling. The DoD established its DNA Repository to
eliminate DNA identification problems experienced during
the Gulf War.' However, the DoD identified every
individual who perished in connection with the Gulf War,
and DNA analysis was necessary in only two of those 388
cases. This leads one to question the extent of these alleged
"DNA identification problems."
117. See SIMMONS, supra note 13, at 29.
118. See id. at 18. Of these deaths, 376 occurred during the conflict, and
twelve additional deaths took place after the cease-fire on April 11, 1991. Id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 34.
122. See id.
123. See id. The two cases in which DNA analysis aided identification were
included within this "other" category. Id.
124. See Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300, 302 (D. Haw. 1995), vacated,
109 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1997).
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C. Inability to Use DNA for Identification Purposes
Remains DNA is not an inert substance. If
contaminated or destroyed, it can no longer be used for the
purposes of remains identification. The DoD would then
have to rely on traditional methods of identification, and
any antemortem DNA stored in the DNA repository would
be useless. 5
Since the battlefield is not a sterile location in which
DNA samples are isolated from environmental
contaminants, there exists a danger of contamination from
both biological and non-biological sources. 6 "The violent
circumstances that render remains identification by DNA
analysis necessary are also the circumstances most likely to
intermingle DNA materials with surrounding
contaminants."=7  Contamination may cause remains
misidentification or render DNA identification impossible.
128
Biological contamination of DNA occurs when DNA
from a different biological entity is introduced into the DNA
sample extracted from the remains.129 This unwanted DNA
may come from human or non-human sources.3 ° Since plant
or animal DNA may be distinguished from human DNA,
addition of these types of DNA to the sample does not
usually pose a great danger for remains identification. 3'
Bacterial DNA similarly presents no major obstacle to
remains identification.1 However, if a DNA sample is
125. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text for a description of the
traditional methods of remains identification utilized in the Gulf War.
126. See SIMMONS, supra note 13, at 12. Cf William C. Thompson & Simon
Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification
Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 66 (1989) (noting that the environmental conditions of
a crime scene can widely vary). The conditions experienced at the crime scene
may be very similar to battlefield conditions when one considers the extent of
the violence and lack of sterility or predictability. One author aptly stated,
"t]here is no telling what happened to these things before we get them." Id.
(describing the condition of DNA samples taken from a crime scene).
127. SnMMONS, supra note 13, at 12.
128. See Paul B. Tyler, Fundamental Misunderstandings About DNA
Contamination: Does It Help or Hurt the Criminal Defendant?, 31 BEVERLY
HILLS B.A. J. 15, 21 (1996).
129. See id. For example, the DNA sample could be mixed with a sample
from another body, or the individual collecting the sample could inadvertently
contribute some of his or her own DNA to the sample. Id.
130. See id. at 23.
131. See id. at 24.
132. See Dwight E. Adams et al., Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Analysis by
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contaminated by DNA from another human source, and this
"cross-contamination" is not discovered, testing results
performed on the sample may produce a false negative
identification or lead to misidentification. 3'
Adverse environmental conditions can lead to
contamination of DNA by non-biological factors.' Light
exposure, moisture, heat, radiation, chemical agents, and
age may either degrade the DNA sample or cut the DNA
into small pieces, making DNA testing impossible.3 5
Thus DNA identification analysis "is not the perfect
identification test since DNA can degrade beyond
recovery."'36  Whether DNA degradation results from
contamination by biological or non-biological sources, it
increases the necessity of traditional remains identification
methods.
D. DNA of Blood Relatives
The DoD DNA Repository consists solely of DNA taken
from members of the armed forces, under the theory that if
a soldier were killed, matching DNA extracted from the
remains to a DNA sample contained in the Repository could
identify the body. However, even in the absence of dental
records or fingerprints, this is not the only alternative for
remains identification.
3 7
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms of Blood and Other Body Fluid
Stains Subjected to Contamination and Environmental Insults, 36 J. FORENSIC
SCIENCES 1284 (1991).
133. Tyler, supra note 128, at 23 n.46.
134. See Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, DNA Identification Tests and
the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REV. 903, 919-20 (1988).
135. See id.; see also U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS 46, 62 (1990). The chemical
agents referred to include natural enzymes or other chemicals present in the
environment such as those found in soil. See Beeler & Wiebe, supra note 134, at
919-20; Christopher G. Shank, Note, DNA Evidence in Criminal Trials:
Modifying the Law's Approach to Protect the Accused from Prejudicial Genetic
Evidence, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 871 n.43 (1992).
136. LORNE T. KIRBY, DNA FINGERPRINTING: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (1990).
137. See JOHN HUNTER ET AL., STUDIES IN CRIME: AN INTRODUCTION TO
FORENSIC ARCHAEOLOGY 128 (1996) (demonstrating that DNA extraction can
provide positive identification of remains if DNA records of the deceased's
relatives are available); T.M. Clayton et al., Case Report, Identification of
Bodies from the Scene of a Mass Disaster using DNA Amplification of Short
Tandem Repeat (STR) Loci, 76 FORENSIC SCIENCE INT'L 7 (1995); WILLIAM R.
MAPLES & MICHAEL BROWNING, DEAD MEN Do TELL TALES 206 (1994); Mitchell
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In August 1991, three individuals in England
successfully identified the remains of a young girl despite
the fact that they did not have any prior DNA sample
against which to compare DNA samples extracted from the
remains. 8' The girl was murdered in 1981, and no one
discovered her remains for eight years.3 9 The English
authorities established her identity in part from a facial
reconstruction and dental records, but they wished to
confirm identity through DNA analysis. 10  Scientists
extracted DNA samples from the skeleton and compared
them to corresponding DNA profiles taken from the blood of
the victim's suspected mother and father.'
Of the six sections of the victim's DNA strand that were
analyzed, every sample indicated that the DNA was from
an offspring of the mother and father tested.' All segments
tested on the DNA strand could be attributed to either the
mother or father." A statistical analysis of this information
confirmed the victim's identity with a likelihood of 200,000
to 1.1" In other words, "the DNA data establish[ed] with a
high degree of confidence that the murder victim was
indeed the daughter of M[other] and F[ather." 45
These results definitively show that an individual's
DNA sample need not have been obtained during his or her
life to successfully carry out DNA identification of remains.
Thus, DNA identification of a soldier's remains is feasible
even though his or her DNA sample is not stored in DoD
Registry. The identification of a soldier's remains by
comparing remains DNA with that of the suspected parents
was in fact successfully carried out shortly after the
identification of the murder victim in England. '
M. Holland et al., Mitochondrial DNA Sequence Analysis of Human Skeletal
Remains: Identification of Remains from The Vietnam War, 38 J. FORENSIC
SCIENCES 542 (1993); William D. Haglund et al., Identification of Decomposed
Human Remains by Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Profiling, 35 J. FORENSIC
SCIENCES 724 (1990).
138. See Erika Hagelberg et al., Identification of the Skeletal Remains of a
Murder Victim by DNA Analysis, 352 NATURE 427 (1991).
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 428.
146. See Holland et al., supra note 137, at 543.
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This technology is not restricted to cases in which
parental DNA is available for comparison. DNA
identification may be carried out by comparing the DNA of
the deceased to DNA samples from other blood relatives.'47
Following the Branch Dividian incident in Waco, Texas in
April 1993 when a number of individuals perished by fire,
authorities identified twenty-six individuals through the
use of reference blood samples and family trees." The
identification process utilized not only the DNA of the
victims' parents, but also that of their children and/or
siblings in order to reach positive identifications.'49
Apparently the United States Army recognizes that
DNA samples from maternal relatives of deceased service
members may be used to identify remains.' In 1992,
approximately one year after the DoD established its DNA
collection policy, the Army collected DNA samples from
ninety families at a conference of the National League of
Family of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast
Asia for the purposes of the identification of remains from
the Vietnam Conflict. 5' Thus, having individual DNA on
file for every service member is not necessary to successful
remains identification; it merely simplifies matters.
Restricting DNA identification procedures to use of DNA
voluntarily supplied by family members of missing service
members could preserve the military's goals of ensuring the
peace of mind of family members and of accounting for the
fate of service members while maintaining the privacy of
the service members' DNA. 15 2
147. See Clayton et al., supra note 137.
148. See id.
149. See id.; see also HUNTER, supra note 137, at 166 (demonstrating that
DNA identification was expanded to the historical context when DNA extracted
from members the Russian Imperial family was compared to DNA extracted
from living descendants).
150. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, POW/MIA AFFAIRS: ISSUES
RELATED TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF HUMAN REMAINS FROM THE VIETNAM
CONFLICT 23 (1992) [hereinafter REMAINS FROM THE VIETNAM CONFLICT].
151. See id.
152. The district court mentioned in Mayfield that identification may be
accomplished through the use of DNA which was previously collected from the
decedent or "his or her biological relatives." 901 F. Supp. at 302. The court was
thus aware that remains identification via statistical comparison of DNA to
that of blood relatives could be carried out.
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IV. LIKELIHOOD THAT THE SAMPLES IN THE DNA REPOSITORY
WOULD BE USED FOR ADVERSE PURPOSES
The district court readily dismissed the marines' fears
that future harm could result from the collection and
storage of their DNA in Gaithersburg, Maryland.'53 The
court restricted its analysis to the degree of intrusion upon
privacy rights to which the marines would have been
subjected had they supplied DNA samples.' Fears of future
discriminatory action were deemed nonjusticiable since
they were based on a hypothetical situation.
5 5
It is true that no discriminatory action had been taken
by the military or a third-party employer based on the
genetic information contained in the marines' DNA
samples. No such action could have taken place because
Mayfield and Vlacovsky refused to provide their samples for
submission to the repository.' Nevertheless, the potential
for future harm based on the improper use of their genetic
information merits discussion. As technology has advanced
during the past decade, more efficient methods of DNA
testing have been developed, more genetic secrets have
been unlocked, and stories of genetic discrimination have
become more common.'57 How likely is it that the hundreds
of thousands of service members providing DNA samples to
the repository could become victims of discrimination based
on this information?
A. Third-Party Employers
Employers who gain access to the records held by the
DoD in Maryland could engage in "genetic screening,"
testing the DNA of an applicant or employee to predict
whether she is genetically predisposed to a develop
disease. 55 Employers are primarily motivated to engage in
153. See Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300, 304 (D. Haw. 1995), vacated,
109 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1997).
154. See generally id. at 304.
155. See id.
156. See Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997).
157. See Richard Saltus, "Who Wants to Know," THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12,
1997, at 8 ("Discrimination on the basis of genes isn't entirely new .... But
now, with the advent of tests for genes that influence one's risk of common
disorders such as cancer and heart disease, genetic discrimination concerns are
far more widespread.").
158. RuTH HUBBARD, EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH: How GENETIC
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such screening for financial reasons, in order to avoid the
increasing costs of employer-provided health care and the
costs of modifying work conditions in occupationally risky
environments. 5'
During the past decade, the cost burden shouldered by
employers who provide health insurance for their
employees has increased dramatically. ° For example, from
1985 to 1991, the cost of health insurance for each employee
increased from $1724 to $3605 per year. 6' Costs continue to
increase by approximately ten to twenty percent each
year.6 ' Employers are experiencing strong financial motives
to reduce the overall cost of providing health insurance for
employees.'63  One response is to engage in genetic
discrimination, simply eliminating those employees who
would need greater or more expensive health care
services."'
INFORMATION IS PRODUCED AND MANIPULATED BY SCIENTISTS, PHYSICIANS,
EMPLOYERS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, EDUCATORS AND LAW ENFORCERS 130-31
(1997). Surveys conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment in 1982 and
1989 suggested that genetic screening is not being widely used in industry. See
id. at 134. However, the response rate for the surveys was only 6%, and no
additional surveys have been conducted by the OTA since that time. See id.; see
also ELAINE DRAPER, RISKY BUSINESS: GENETIC TESTING AND EXCLUSIONARY
PRACTICES IN THE HAZARDOUS WORKPLACE 11 (1991); Roberto Pulver, Genetic
Screening in the Workplace: a "Fit" for Consumers?, 5 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP.
13, 14(1992).
159. See Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 23, 28-29 (1992) [hereinafter
Employment and the ADA]; DRAPER, supra note 158, at 13.
160. See Employment and the ADA, supra note 159, at 28-29.
161. See id.
162. See id; see also Burk Burnett, Genetic Discrimination: Legislation
Required to Keep Genetic Secrets, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 502, 506 n.21 (1997).
163. See HUBBARD, supra note 158, at 131; MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN
EMPLOYMENT SCREENING 3 (1995); MARKA ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW
§ 2.25 (1994); see also Employment and the ADA, supra note 159, at 29 (noting
that an employer may avoid hiring, for example, cigarette smokers, people who
are HIV positive, or people with high cholesterol levels); Larry Gostin, Genetic
Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests
by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 119 (1991).
164. See id.; see also Henry T. Greely, Health Insurance, Employment
Discrimination, and the Genetics Revolution, in THE CODE OF CODES 269 (Daniel
J. Kevles & Leroy Hood, eds. 1992) ("When employers can select their own
workers and design their own health benefit plans, their incentive to save
money on health costs makes added information about the expected future
health of current or potential employees dangerous.").
In 1993, the NIH-DOE Task Force on Genetic Information and Insurance
completed a study focusing on the potential effects of the availability and
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Additional labor costs which employers try to reduce
include the expense of absenteeism, sick leave, disability
benefits, and training new employees to replace those lost
to illness or death.' Screening may be used to identify
workers or applicants whose future health could be at risk,
thereby weeding out undesirable costly candidates."'
Instances of genetic discrimination committed for
reasons such as those mentioned above have already
occurred in connection with employment." ' For example,
once a young social worker's employer discovered that she
was at risk to develop Huntington's chorea, she was given a
poor performance review and subsequently fired. 6 All of
her prior job reviews had been excellent.'69 A fellow worker
informed the young social worker that her employer was
worried about her developing the disease.' ° In another
instance, a woman indicated on a pre-employment form
that she had Charcot-Marie-Tooth Disease (CMT), a
neuromuscular disorder known to have variable levels of
manifestation. When her interviewer found out what this
heritable disease was, he did not hire her.'' Furthermore, a
young man carrying an allele associated with Gaucher
disease, a recessive condition, was not allowed to enlist in
accessibility of genetic information in the health care arena. TASK FORCE ON
GENETIC INFORMATION & INSURANCE, NIH-DOE GROUP ON ETHICAL, LEGAL &
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH, GENETIC INFORMATION &
HEALTH INSURANCE 1 (1993) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. One of the Task Force's
final recommendations was to make participation in and access to health care
services independent from a person's employment. See id. at 2, 11. Such action
could eliminate the strong incentive for employers to avoid hiring or to
terminate employment of potentially unhealthy employees. See generally id. at
11.
165. See HUBBARD, supra note 158, at 131.
166. Id.
167. See Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic
Screening, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 476 (1992); C. Thomas Caskey & Belinda
J.F. Rossiter, The Genome Project and Clinical Medicine, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL
ISSUES RAISED BY THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 44-45 (Mark A. Rothstein ed.,
1991); Vince Bielski, Your Boss Wants More Than Your Blood: Genetic Testing
Comes to the Workplace, 16 CALIFORNIA LAWYER 18 (Nov. 1996); Rosemary
Orthmann, Ph.D., Genetic Testing Can Lead to Job Discrimination, EMPL.
TESTING (Univ. Pub. Am.) 174 (Nov. 1996) (referring to a recent survey of 332
people in which 43% indicated that they had in fact experienced genetic
discrimination in employment, health insurance, or life insurance).
168. See Bielski, supra note 167, at 18.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id; see also Billings, supra note 167, at 479.
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the Armed Forces.' The carrier condition would never have
manifested itself.7 3 In another instance, a man's son was
severely disabled due to a genetic disease.'74 This man
learned while participating in his company's annual
insurance negotiations to select a health insurer that his
son's illness was actually a liability to the firm. 17 One
insurer dropped the company on grounds that the company
failed to inform the insurer of the boy's pre-existing
condition."6 Bidding insurance companies notified the firm
that rates for the firm would be considerably lower if the
man and his family were dropped from coverage. 7 The man
felt that he was denied promotion at the firm due to all of
the insurance difficulties stemming from his son's genetic
illness. 7
8
In addition, genetic screening has been implemented in
accordance with the susceptibility doctrine.17 Under this
theory, employees in hazardous occupations are specifically
tested for any inherited traits which could predispose them
to occupational disease.8 ° Employers ordinarily target
diseases which environmental conditions in the workplace
would likely exacerbate.' Under this policy, workers
possessing genetic indicators of disease may be removed
from more hazardous conditions in order to decrease the
chances of disease manifestation.82
Such testing could be beneficial in the workplace, since
it may actually improve the health of those genetically
predisposed to disease whose conditions could be worsened
by exposure to a hazardous work environment.83 However,
genetic screening of workers or applicants is not a
completely benign procedure."8 Since genetic screening is
172. See Billings, supra note 167, at 15.
173. See id.
174. See TASK FORCE, supra note 164, at 7.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Draper, supra note 158, at 11.
180. See id.
181. See id. For example, employees working with substances which are
known carcinogens may be screened for the presence of cancer-linked genes.
182. See id. at 25.
183. See Gostin, supra note 163, at 111.
184. See DAvID F. LINoWEs, PRIVACY IN AMERICA: Is YouR PRIVATE LIFE IN
THE PUBLIC EYE? 15-16 (1989).
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predictive screening, discriminatory practices may result.'
The screening often reveals no more than the potential for
disease manifestation, and, in many cases, the individual
possessing the genetic trait is asymptomatic. 8 ' In these
circumstances, employment decisions are based, not on an
individual's present ability to perform a certain task, but on
the risk of future disability to perform due to disease, a
disability which may never materialize.'87  Moreover,
employers' interpretation of genetic screening may lead to
the exclusion of individuals who are merely disease carriers
as well as people who only stand to develop a minor form of
the genetically-linked disease.'88
While employers say the tests lower medical costs and enable
susceptible workers to avoid hazardous employment, many labor
leaders and those concerned with personal privacy see dangers in
labeling certain individuals or groups as "high risk." Such labeling
could involve a loss of career or health care coverage for the worker.
Id.
185. See Mark A. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING AND THE EMPLOYEE
HEALTH COST CRISIS 1 (1989) [hereinafter MEDICAL SCREENING].
186. See Kristie A. Deyerle, Genetic Testing in the Workplace: Employer
Dream, Employee Nightmare-Legislative Regulation in the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 547, 556 (1997), citing
Marvin R. Natowicz et al., Genetic Discrimination and the Law, 50 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 465, 465 (1992); see also HUBBARD, supra note 158, at 24 ("We all
carry alleles that would be disabling or lethal if we or our children had two
copies of them instead of just one.").
The term asymptomatic refers to physically and/or psychologically healthy
individuals who are treated as disabled or ill based on an abnormal genotype.
See Billings et al., supra note 167, at 479. An asymptomatic individual exhibits
no symptoms of disease. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 111
(1990).
187. See HUBBARD, supra note 158, at 12 ("All too often genes are looked on
as absolute predictors.... We must remember that genetic functions are
embedded in complex networks of biological reactions and social and economic
relationships."); Gostin, supra note 163, at 118; see also Dorothy Nelkin, The
Social Power of Genetic Information, in THE CODE OF CODES 188 (Daniel J.
Kevles & Leroy Hood, eds. 1992) (noting that in many cases the risk for genetic
disease has been treated the same as actually having the disease, even if there
are no "obvious manifestations of illness").
188. See Gostin, supra note 163, at 118; T.H. Cushing, Should There Be
Genetic Testing in Insurance Risk Classification? Arguments Both For and
Against the Use of this New Technology May be "Right" and Some Form of
Universal Health Care May be the Result, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 249, 251 (1993).
[Genetic testing] will reveal the potential for a person, who may appear
to be perfectly healthy in all respects, to develop a disease many years
in the future. The chances that a person currently asymptomatic will
contract a particular disease will vary depending on the disease and
the person's genetic composition. Some people will have a higher
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Despite increasing concerns in recent years regarding
genetic discrimination, no federal legislation directly
addresses this problem.'89 Although a former service
member who works in the private sector could potentially
bring a cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,190 Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),191 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196412 if he
were discriminated against on the basis of his genetic
make-up,'93 it is unclear whether such a cause of action
would have any potential for success. Noting this absence of
protection, fourteen states have passed laws to protect
victims of genetic discrimination. However, with the lack
of any protection whatsoever in the remaining thirty-six
states, one may understand why the marines in Mayfield,
along with hundreds of other Americans, fear that they too
will become casualties in the recent cost-cutting trend.
1. Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Rehabilitation Act of
1973 was promulgated to help individuals with disabilities
"maximize their leadership, empowerment, independence,
and productivity" and better integrate into society'9 by
prohibiting employers from discriminating against people
with disabilities. 9 The Act applies to entities who receive
federal subsidies or contracts,' 97 but can apply to federal
agencies themselves, except in circumstances where the
federal agency plays the role of an employer.' 9 This
constituted the first attempt to include disabled individuals
predisposition to certain diseases, while others will face the certainty
that the particular illness will appear.
Id.
189. See Gostin, supra note 163, at 119.
190. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1994).
191. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
192. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 14 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
193. See Gostin, supra note 163, at 119-20; Deyerle, supra note 186, at 566;
Employment and the ADA, supra note 159, at 33-34; Pulver, supra note 158, at
17-18.
194. See infra notes 258-86 and accompanying text.
195. 29 U.S.C. § 796. See also Kathleen Zeitz, Employer Genetic Testing: A
Legitimate Screening Device or Another Method of Discrimination?, 42 LAB. L.J.
230, 234 (1991).
196. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1994).
197. See 29 U.S.C. § 793.
198. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
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within the "mainstream of American society,"'99 and the
elements of disability discrimination established under this
Act were adopted by the 1990 ADA and expanded to the
private sector.= °°
In order to gain protection under the Rehabilitation Act,
an employee would first have to demonstrate that she
would be considered disabled due to her genetic condition. 01
A disabled person is defined as: "any person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment."212 Once this is demonstrated, the employee
must meet three additional requirements. She must show
that but for the genetic impairment, she would be fully
qualified to perform the job, that she was excluded from the
job solely because of the disability, and that the program
from which she was excluded is one which is "receiving
Federal financial assistance or... conducted by any
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service."20
In response, the employer would have to provide a
"reasonable accommodation" for the employee.2 4 The failure
to provide a reasonable accommodation is unlawful
discrimination unless the employer can show that making
such an accommodation would cause him or her undue
hardship.0 5 Undue financial burden on the employer would
legitimately excuse the employer from having to
accommodate a disabled individual,... but the employer may
not exclude people with disabilities from the workplace
solely based on the fear of future health care costs.0 7
Examples of reasonable accommodations include things
such as modified work schedules, transfer of job tasks to
199. 29 U.S.C. § 796. See MTEDICAL SCREENING, supra note 185, at 125; see
also Natowicz et al., supra note 186, at 468.
200. See Pulver, supra note 158, at 19; see infra notes 238 to 259 and
accompanying text for information on the Americans with Disabilities Act.
201. See 29 U.S.C. § 791(g). See also HUBBARD, supra note 158, at 136;
Pulver, supra note 158, at 18.
202. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(1) (1998).
203. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). See Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694
F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1982); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774-75 (2d
Cir. 1981).
204. 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (1988).
205. See id.
206. See Zeitz, supra note 195, at 234-35.
207. See Natowicz, supra note 186, at 469.
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coworkers, provision of auxiliary aids (such as a part-time
reader for a blind employee), and removal of structural or
architectural barriers for employees who are mobility-
impaired. °8
Case law shows that the Rehabilitation Act could apply
to future health risks which have not yet impeded an
employee's performance, provided that the potential
impairment at issue was substantial. 9 In E.E. Black, Ltd.
v. Marshall, the pre-employment medical exam of a
carpenter revealed a lower back problem for which he was
denied employment.21" Though the condition could have
disabling effects in the future, it did not prevent the
carpenter from performing job tasks at the time of his
medical exam.21 The court concluded that the carpenter's
condition qualified as an impairment or a condition
regarded as an impairment which could constitute a
substantial handicap to his employment.212 In so ruling, the
court impliedly accepted the notion that the Rehabilitation
Act could apply to situations in which a person is denied
employment because of a potential future injury.
Cases concerning AIDS which have been brought under
the Rehabilitation Act suggest that this Act could be used to
fight genetic discrimination.2 13 AIDS has been generally
classified as a "handicap" under section 794 of the
Rehabilitation Act.214 In some cases, the courts made this
determination even though the HIV-positive individual was
completely asymptomatic.21" Thus, lack of observable
208. See id.
209. See MEDICAL SCREENING, supra note 185, at 128-30.
210. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
211. See id. at 1091-92.
212. See id. at 1102-03.
213. See Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs. of Hosp. District No. 1, 909 F.2d 820,
824-25 (5th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990);
Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632, 635 (D. Mass. 1991); Doe v. Centinela
Hosp., No. CV87-2514 PAR, 1988 WL 81776, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988).
214. 29 U.S.C. § 794. See Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 824-25 (assuming for appeal
purposes that seropositivity is a protected impairment under the Rehabilitation
Act); Garrett, 903 F.2d at 1459 (noting that it is "well established that infection
with AIDS constitutes a handicap for the purposes of the [Rehabilitation] Act");
Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 635 (recognizing that several districts and the
Department of Justice have categorized HIV-positive status as a "handicap"
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act); Centinela, 1988 WL 81776, at *6.
215. See Garrett, 903 F.2d at 1457; Centinela, 1988 WL 81776, at *4
("Plaintiff is currently, to law observation, asymptomatic. He has not yet
suffered from any opportunistic infections .... Nor does he presently have
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symptoms does not preclude an individual from protection
under the Act, provided that the employer regards her as
disabled.216
In order to determine whether genetic discrimination
would be protected under this Act, one must determine
whether the case law concerning asymptomatic HIV
positive individuals will be applied to situations in which an
asymptomatic individual possesses a gene which increases
his likelihood of developing a disease. A major difference
between these two groups is the probability of the onset of
disease. When a person is HIV-positive, they will inevitably
develop either full-blown AIDS or a less severe form of
illness known as AIDS-Related Complex (ARC). In any
event, medical research shows that once infected, an HIV-
positive individual "follows a predictable and...
unalterable course" from infection to death.217 On the other
hand, possession of a gene linked to disease does not
guarantee that such disease will manifest itself in most
cases; it only increases likelihood that a person will
manifest the disease. Could an employee still be regarded
as disabled by an employer, when, in addition to being
asymptomatic, she may never manifest any disease? This
question remains to be answered by the courts.
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. When
enacted in 1990, Title I of the American with Disabilities
Act (ADA)218 essentially extended protections created under
the Rehabilitation Act to employees in the private sector.1 9
Under the ADA, disability is broadly defined as: "(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities... (B) a record of such
limitations on the functions of caring for himself, performing manual tests,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning or working."). It is
important to note, however, that the use of the term "asymptomatic" with AIDS
is a bit misleading. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2204 (1998). During
the asymptomatic phase of AIDS, conditions such as "lymphadenopathy,
dermatological disorders, oral lesions, and bacterial infections" will manifest
themselves in the I seropositive individual. See id; infra notes 238-39 and
accompanying text.
216. See Garrett, 903 F.2d at 1458-59 (noting that HIV infection may be
considered a handicap as defined in the Rehabilitation Act); Centinela, 1988 WL
81776, at *4, 6 (concluding that an asymptomatic patient was perceived as
handicapped).
217. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2203 (summarizing scientific research presented
in the case and relied upon by the Court).
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impairment, or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment."' " Thus, a person may have a disability if she
possesses an actual incapacity,' if she recovered from an
actual incapacity,222 or if she is perceived by society as being
disabled, despite the lack of any real incapacity.
223
In addition to possessing a disability, the individual
seeking relief under the ADA must be a "qualified"
individual-a person who, "with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or
desires.,2 ' The employer may identify these essential job
operations225 which a qualified individual would have to be
able to perform at the time of her application for
employment.226
It is not evident whether ADA would protect an
individual subjected to genetic discrimination. Examination
of the legislative history of the ADA indicates that the
subject of genetic discrimination received little attention at
the time of the ADA's enactment.227 Although the dangers of
genetic discrimination were recognized, in particular those
relating to former sickle cell screening programs, 28
Congress decided that the courts should be left to determine
whether genetic discrimination was included within the
confines of this Act.229 Thus, if an employer chooses not to
hire an individual based on a genetic profile revealing the
218. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
219. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17; Deyerle, supra note 186, at 568; Pulver,
supra note 158, at 19; Gostin, supra note 163, at 120.
220. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
221. See § 12102(2)(A).
222. See § 12102(2)(B). For example, an employee who recovered from a very
limiting or potentially fatal disease such as cancer may be subjected to
discrimination by employers who are aware of the record of that employee's
disability. See Gostin, supra note 163, at 122. Such an employer may choose not
to hire the recovered individual out of fear that the disease may return and
interfere with job performance or subject the employer to high health care costs.
Id.
223. See § 12102(2)(C). Some individuals are discriminated against based on
the possession of a stigmatic condition that society wrongly perceives as
disabling. See Gostin, supra note 163, at 123.
224. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8).
225. See Zeitz, supra note 195, at 236.
226. See Pulver, supra note 158, at 19.
227. See Gostin, supra note 163, at 121.
228. See infra Part 1V.B.
229. See Gostin, supra note 163, at 121.
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risk of future disease, but such disease has not yet and may
never manifest itself, no one is certain whether the
applicant or employee may seek protection under the
ADA. 23
0
Although the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) states that such a person should be
considered disabled, since she would fall under the
"regarded as" provision of sec. 12102(2)(C) of the Act."3 The
Commission's 1995 Compliance Manual contains an
example of such a situation even though courts may not
accept this position.23 2.
CP's [the charging party's] genetic profile reveals an increased
susceptibility to colon cancer. CP [the charging party] is currently
asymptomatic and may never in fact develop colon cancer. After
making CP a conditional offer of employment, R [the employer]
learns about CP's increased susceptibility to colon cancer. R then
withdraws the job offer because of concerns about matters such as
CP's productivity, insurance costs, and attendance. R is treating
the CP as having an impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity. Accordingl&3 CP is covered by the third part of the
definition of "disability.Y.
There has been speculation that courts could draw an
analogy between people who are HIV seropositive but
asymptomatic for AIDS, who have been classified as
disabled, 4 and individuals possessing a latent genetic
condition.235 HIV is not a genetically-linked disorder, but a
person who discovers that he is HIV seropositive may be in
a situation very similar to the individual whose genetic
230. See ROTHSTEiN, Employment and the ADA, supra note 159, at 47-48.
231. Richard H. Underwood & Ronald G. Cadle, Genetics, Genetic Testing,
and the Specter of Discrimination: A Discussion Using Hypothetical Cases, 85
KY. L.J. 665, 677 (1997) (quoting Arpiar Saunder, Jr. & Bennett B. Mortell,
Genetic Testing-Genetic Discrimination: State and Federal Statutes Provide
Possible Remedies, N.H. B.J., Dec. 1995, at 23, 30).
232. See Underwood, supra note 231 n.46, at 678, citing Robert L. Duston,
Courts Will Scrutinize EEOC's Definition of Disability, Empl. Testing (Univ.
Pub. Am.) 97, 101-02 (July 1995) ("Based on the trend in the courts... to place
reasonable limits on the ADA, it appears likely that the courts will give several
aspects of the EEOC's guidelines close scrutiny."); Deyerle, supra note 186, at
572 ("Whether the courts will accept such an expanded definition of disability as
reflecting Congressional intent is yet to be determined.").
233. EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 902.8(a) (1995).
234. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); Chalk v. United States
Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
235. See Deyerle, supra note 186, at 571-72.
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profile indicates that she may develop a disease in the
future."6 After an HIV-infected individual passes through
the initial acute phase during which it is evident that he or
she is sick,237 the HIV infection passes into what is known
as an asymptomatic phase which can last from seven to
eleven years."8  However, unlike an asymptomatic
individual who could develop a genetically-linked disease
and who experiences no current disorders, an HIV-positive
individual in the "asymptomatic" phase often experiences
clinical effects of HIV, such as enlargement of the lymph
nodes, skin problems, oral lesions and infections.239 Thus, an
HIV positive individual is not asymptomatic in the true
sense of the term.
In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court recognized
that the HIV virus negatively affects an individual's health
from the moment of infection and is not truly inactive
during the so-called "asymptomatic" phase.24 As such, the
Supreme Court held that HIV is "an impairment from the
moment of infection."4 However, genetic indicators of the
potential for disease development differ from the HIV virus
in that they do not constitute a physical impairment from
the moment of infection. Many genetic indicators represent
no more than an increased risk of disease development. "42
Thus, the reasoning which the Supreme Court used to
classify HIV-positive individuals as individuals with a
disability does not appear applicable to individuals
possessing genetic indicators of disease.
However, finding that a condition constitutes a
substantial impairment is only the first step of the analysis.
The impairment will only be considered a disability if it
affects a "major life activity."243 In Bragdon, the Court held
that HIV fulfilled this requirement because it substantially
236. See id.
237. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2203-04. The HTV seropositive individual
will experience symptoms similar to those associated with mononucleosis. See
id. at 2203. In addition, he can suffer from fever, headache, enlargement of the
lymph nodes, muscle pain, depression, gastrointestinal problems, and
neurological disorders. See id.
238. See id. at 2204.
239. See id.
240. Id. at 2203-04.
241. Id. at 2204.
242. See Deyerle, supra note 186, at 556.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
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interfered with the life activity of reproduction.2" Unless a
court found that a genetic indicator of the potential for
future disease was a substantial impairment that interfered
with a major life activity such as walking, hearing,
breathing, or reproducing, a genetic defect will not
constitute a disability. Obviously, the fact that prior to
disease manifestation the individual carrying a gene linked
to disease experiences no symptoms caused by such gene
will make it difficult to prove that the indicator affects any
major life activity. Without any cases to support the
inclusion of a genetic trait as a disability, employers are not
forced into statutory compliance and employees are not
protected against genetic discrimination.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII) 5 prohibits discrimination in hiring,
firing, compensation, or other terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of an individual's race,
religion, gender, or national origin." Title VII applies to all
employers with fifteen or more employees, labor
organizations, employment agencies, and state or municipal
governments. M
Title VII could be used to combat genetic screening
since some genetic traits are most common among
particular racial or ethnic groups or are found more
frequently among members of one sex.248 For example, Tay-
Sachs and Gaucher's disease are commonly found among
Ashkenazi Jews, sickle cell anemia most often affects people
of African heritage, and Family Mediterranean Fever is
frequently found in Armenians.249 Risks for congenital
244. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205. Regulations passed to clarify the
Rehabilitation Act elaborate upon what constitutes a major life activity:
"functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 45 C.F.R. §
84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1997). These regulations apply to
the ADA as well the Rehabilitation Act since 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) requires that
the ADA be construed consistently with all regulations implemented to
interpret the Rehabilitation Act.
245. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
247. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (e).
248. See Deyerle, supra note186, at 567; Pulver, supra note 158, at 18;
Gostin, supra note 163, at 137. See also, ROTHSTEIN, MIEDICAL SCREENING, supra
note 185, at 174-79.
249. See generally Goldstein & Brown, Genetic Aspects of Disease, in
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abnormalities and risks of fetal genetic damage
(teratogenicity) affect women in general or pregnant women
in particular. 50 Thus, genetic screen-ing may potentially
have a discriminatory impact on members of a protected
class and be grounds for a Title VII action.25'
Genetic discrimination claims would most likely be
brought under the theory of "disparate impact, ""' in which
case the plaintiff must prove that the genetic screening,
although facially neutral in application, disproportionately
eliminated a protected class from opportunities for
employment.253 In order to succeed, the plaintiff need not
show that the employer or potential employer harbored any
discriminatory intent-the focus is purely on the impact of
that employer's actions.254 However, even if disparate
impact is demonstrated, the employer may be "let off the
hook" if he or she can show that there was a business
necessity for the employment practice in question.25 Then
the employer will in fact be allowed to "lawfully
discriminate against an individual due to his immutable
characteristics because the immutable characteristics truly
prevent the individual from properly doing the job."256
Although it is clear that Title VII could be construed to
protect some victims of genetic discrimination, Title VII
cannot protect a majority of employees or applicants who
HARRISON'S PRmCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICIN 285 (E. Braunwald, et al. eds.,
1987).
250. See Gostin, supra note 163, at 137.
251. See Deyerle, supra note , at 566-67 ("Because some genetic traits are
associated with certain racial or ethnic groups, or found more frequently in one
sex than in the other, genetic screening may unintentionally have a disparate
impact on members of a protected class."); Pulver, supra note 158, at 18.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). See also Deyerle, supra note 186, at 567; Gostin,
supra note 163, at 138 (stating that protection against genetic discrimination
under Title VII would most likely be brought under a disparate impact theory).
253. See Pulver, supra note 158, at 18.
254. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) ("[Pjractices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices."); Pulver, supra note 158, at 18; Gostin,
supra note 163, at 137.
255. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(2)(k)(1)(A)(i).
256. Pulver, supra note 158, at 18. See also Gostin, supra note 163, at 138
(citing Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984) and
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982)) (noting that an employee
who demonstrates a business necessity for his or her actions is justified in
carrying out a practice which might otherwise be considered discriminatory).
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are excluded from a position due to their genetic profile.257
Most genetic disorders or diseases do not predominantly
affect a protected class.258 Unless a protected class is
affected, Title VII does not apply. In any event, no plaintiff
who was a member of a protected class and brought a cause
of action under Title VII for genetic discrimination on a
disparate impact theory has ever been successful.259 Again,
employees suffering from genetic discrimination are left
with little or no protection.
4. State Laws. In the absence of federal legislation
which directly addresses genetic discrimination, some
states have enacted their own statutes.26 ° Apparently, the
few state legislatures who have passed laws to limit the
accessibility and use of genetic information recognized that
federal efforts to keep up with rapid technological advances
have failed.26 At present, fourteen states have laws which
prohibit employers from using genetic information to
discriminate against applicants and employees,262 and
additional states are considering similar bills.263
In 1997, New York passed a statute which provided
employees and applicants with extensive protection against
genetic discrimination in the workplace. Section 296 of
New York Executive Law bars employers from
discriminating against individuals based on their "genetic
predisposition or carrier status."265 In addition, employers
257. See Deyerle, supra note 186, at 567.
258. See id. at 568.
259. See id.; see e.g., Smith v. Olin Chem. Corp., 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir.
1977) (noting that although discrimination based on bone degeneration did
disparately impact a protected class, such discrimination was allowed under the
business necessity theory because a good back is an essential job requirement
for a manual laborer).
260. See Robert Pear, States Pass Laws to Regulate Uses of Genetic Testing,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1997, at Al; Saltus, supra note 157, at 8.
261. See Michael M.J. Lin, Conferring a Federal Property Right in Genetic
Material: Stepping Into the Future With the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J.L. &
MED. 109, 123 (1996) (discussing legislative responses at the state level).
262. See Deyerle, supra note 186, at 578-80; Sandra N. Hurd, States
Consider Genetic Testing Bills, EMPLOYMENT TEsTING-L. & POLY REP., Nov.
1997, at 187 [hereinafter Hurd, Genetic Testing Bills]; Sandra N. Hurd, More
States Restrict Use of Genetic Information, EMPLOYMENT TESTiNG-L. & PoLy
REP., Oct. 1997, at 161 [hereinafter Hurd, States Restrict Use].
263. See infra notes 282-87.
264. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 1997).
265. Id. § 296(1)(a).
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are precluded from requesting, requiring, or administering
genetic tests as a prerequisite to employment,266 unless such
testing is directly related to the working environment and
is used to protect employees possessing genetic anomalies
which create a greater risk of contracting the disease if they
were to work in this environment.67 Under this statute,
employees retain the option of consenting to genetic testing
in relation to worker's compensations claims, civil litigation,
or checking worker susceptibility.' 17
Laws passed in Texas,2"9 North Carolina270  and
Arizona271 prohibit employers from discriminating against
an individual based on genetic information or the results of
a genetic test. Oregon's laws bar employers from collecting
or using genetic information to "distinguish between or
discriminate against or restrict any right or benefit
otherwise due or available to an employee or a prospective
employee" unless used with the employee or applicant's
consent in order to "determine a bona fide occupational
qualification."272 Oklahoma's bill prohibits discrimination
against anyone with a genetic predisposition to a
genetically-linked health problem and prevents employers
from requiring employees or applicants to participate in
genetic testing.27 3 Maine enacted a statute which prohibits
genetic discrimination in employment and protects certain
personal information, including2 genetic test results, against
use in insurance transactions. Statutes in California,275
Delaware,276 New Hampshire, 77 Iowa,275 Rhode Islandy7 9 and
Wisconsin 28 are similarly designed to prevent employers
266. See id. § 296(19)(a)(1).
267. See id. § 296(19)(b).
268. See id. § 296(19)(c-d).
269. See H.B. 39, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1215
(West).
270. See 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 350 (N.C. 1997).
271. See H.B. 2144, 43d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Az. 1997).
272. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.036, 659.227 (1995).
273. See Genetic Nondiscrimination in Employment Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 36, § 3614.2 (West 1998).
274. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 19301-02 (West 1998).
275. See CAL. GoV. CODE §§ 12921, 12926(h) (West 1998).
276. See S.B. 337, 139th Gen. Assembly, 2d. Reg. Sess., 1998 Del. Laws 457
(Del. 1998).
277. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:3(I) (1995).
278. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 729.6 (West 1995).
279. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-1 (1994)
280. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.372(1) (West 1997).
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from using genetic tests as a condition of employment and
using any information supplied in a genetic profile to make
employment decisions.
South Carolina passed a bill which ensures the
confidentiality of genetic information by limiting
circumstances under which it may be disclosed.81 However,
this bill focuses predominantly upon the use of genetic
information in insurance transactions and does not directly
address the protection of genetic information in
employment situations."2 Finally, legislation passed in
Illinois requires that employers treat information from
genetic testing in a manner "consistent with the
requirements of federal law, including but not limited to the
Americans with Disabilities Act."
283
Additional states considered bills which would combat
genetic discrimination by employers.284 In 1998, Connecticut
legislators proposed two bills, H.B. 5471 and S.B. 80, which
would have expanded the scope of discriminatory practices
by an employer to include requests for genetic information
or hiring and firing decisions based upon genetic
information.285 The Connecticut legislature did not pass
either of these bills.286 Utah also proposed, but failed to
pass, a bill which would have regulated genetic testing and
precluded the use of genetic information in conjunction with
hiring, firing, promotion, or any other employment-related
determination. 87 Finally, the state of Kentucky passed a
resolution on March 20, 1998 which required that the
Legislative Research Commission "conduct a comprehensive
study of the impact of genetic testing on health, life, and
disability income insurance."288  The results of this study
were scheduled for release in May of 1999.289
States that have passed legislation banning genetic
discrimination have rapidly responded to the sudden
281. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-93-10, 38-93-20, 38-93-30 (Law Co-op. 1998).
282. See id.
283. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 513/25 (West 1998).
284. See Hurd, Genetic Testing Bills, supra note 262.
285. See Sandra N. Hurd & Rosemary Orthmann, States Mull Genetic
Testing Issues in 1998, EMPLoYMENT TESTING-L. & PoLy REP., May 1998, at
65.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. S.R. 161,1998 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998).
289. Id.
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technological and biological advances which have made
such protection a necessity. Though fourteen states have
acted and additional states are likely to consider related
bills in their upcoming sessions, victims of such
discrimination remain unprotected the thirty-six states that
lack genetic discrimination laws. In the absence of federal
protections, residents of such states may legally be
discriminating against on the basis of their genetic code.
5. Accessibility. If a third-party employer could gain
access to the genetic information stored at the DoD DNA
Repository, she could conceivably use this information to
decide who to hire and fire on the basis of disease risk
factors. Although such action would be illegal in the
fourteen states with statutes addressing genetic
discrimination, discriminatory actions would be legal in
states without legislation since no federal law has yet been
held to address such conduct. Furthermore, even if an
employee or applicant lived in a state in which he was
protected against genetic discrimination, he would not
bring a cause of action for discrimination against a
potential or present employer unless he has an idea that
the employer was in fact engaging in genetic
discrimination. Commonly, an employee is completely
unaware that his employer has obtained access to his
genetic profile and acted in a discriminatory manner. The
state protections against genetic discrimination could fail to
protect people under these circumstances.
The primary question to address, therefore, is whether
an employer could somehow gain access to the genetic
information held in the DoD DNA Repository. The military
has instituted a number of policies in order to protect the
information in the repository and ensure that access to the
DNA Repository "facility, computer system and samples
themselves is strictly limited.""' First of all, individual
specimens kept in the Gaithersburg, Maryland facility will
be destroyed upon completion of the donor's military service
at the request of the donor.29' Absent such request, the
samples are routinely destroyed at the conclusion of fifty
290. Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300, 302 (D. Haw. 1995), vacated, 109
F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Mayfield, 109 F.3d at 1425-26.
291. See Mayfield, 109 F.3d at 1425-26 n.1.
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years of storage."' Secondly, permissible uses of thesamples are limited to:
(a) identification of human remains; (b) internal quality assurance
activities to validate processes for collection, maintenance and
analysis of samples; (c) a purpose for which the donor of the
sample (or surviving next-of-kin) provides consent; or (d) as
compelled by other applicable law in a case in which all of the
following conditions are present: (1) the responsible DoD official
has received a proper judicial order or judicial authorization; (2)
the specimen sample is needed for the investigation or prosecution
of a crime punishable by one year or more of confinement; (3) no
reasonable alternative means for obtaining a specimen for DNA
profile analysis is available; and (4) the use is approved by the
[Assistant Secretary of Defense Health Affairs] after consultation
with the DoD General Counsel. -'
The computerized records are apparently kept in
controlled areas to which only authorized personnel have
access.294 Unless an individual has a valid requirement or
need and is authorized to enter, entry is restricted because
the information from DNA is considered confidential.
295
Those who are granted access to the records are trained in
the "proper safeguarding and use of the information."296
Such protections do not necessarily insure that an
independent party cannot obtain access to the records held
by the U.S. military.
If no DNA analysis is conducted upon the samples
stored at the DNA Repository, the information in the DNA
remains encoded and, ideally, causes no harm to any service
member. The sole manner of access to genetic information
would be to enter the facility, obtain a sample, and perform
DNA testing on it. It would appear to be unlikely under
these circumstances that a third-party employer would gain
access to a service member's or former service member's
genetic information.
However, while the cost to continuously refrigerate
millions of blood and cheek cell samples for up to fifty years
292. See id.
293. Id.; see also Gill, supra note 12, at 185 (citing Memorandum, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), to Secretary of the Army, subject: Policy
Refinements for the Armed Forces Repository of Specimen Samples for the
Identification of Remains (Apr. 2, 1996)); 63 Fed. Reg. 10205, 10206 (1998).
294. See 63 Fed. Reg. 10205, 10207 (1998).
295. See id.
296. Id.
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is presumed to be rather high, the cost of genetic testing
continues to drop. It is likely that in the future the cost
benefit of storing the samples will be less than the cost
benefit of decoding the genetic information in the sample
and electronically storing the information.297  If this
occurred, anyone who gained electronic access to the record
could successfully retrieve information regarding a service
member by entering that person's surname, social security
number, specimen reference, or Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology accession number, and date of birth.298 In
analyzing record accessibility, the focus will be on the
security or potential lack of security of the DoD's computer
system.
6. Information Privacy. In his 1989 book Privacy in
America: Is Your Private Life in the Public Eye?, David
Linowes explored the extent to which people readily
relinquish personal information and third parties such as
governmental authorities, employers, insurance companies,
and financial institutions access and store this data. 9 In
our information-based society, information is power.
Computers augment this power by increasing one's capacity
to collect, retrieve, and process information.3
With all of the technological advancements enjoyed
during the past few decades, many would be surprised to
learn that no computer or computer system is totally
secure.'O A former CIA employee noted ten years ago,
"there is no such thing as an entirely secure electronic-data
or voice communication network anywhere." 2 This same
problem exists today. Apparently, we do not yet have the
ability to completely protect large-scale computer
systems,"3 and the explosion in use of computers and
297. In fact, some identifying information may currently be electronically
stored. See id. ("Storage: Records are stored manually and electronically.").
298. See id.
299. See generally LINOWES, supra note 184.
300. See id. at 16. See also Arthur Allen, Exposed; Computer Technology,
Managed Health Care and Genetic Science are all Undermining the American
Tradition of Medical Privacy, in the Name of Progress. What Can--or Should-
We Do About It?, WASH. POST MAG., Feb. 8, 1998, at 11, 12 ("The more
information available [on computers], the greater the opportunity for it to be
abused.").
301. See id..
302. See id at 17.
303. See id at 10 (discussing comments by Donn Parker, who was a senior
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telecommunications has provided an open forum for
computer crime."4 By computerizing records, organizations
make their information vulnerable to discovery, since
parties can then attempt access using legal or illegal
methods.0 5 "A $500 investment in equipment can give
anyone in a van parked along the curb the ability to read off
information appearing on computer screens in offices
several stories above the street, and more sensitive
equipment can pick off computer data from two kilometers
away.""0 In addition, sophisticated computer users have a
variety of techniques at their disposal to gain access to
secured information.0 7 "Electronic piggybacking" is a
process whereby an individual bypasses an automated
electronic identification verification control in the computer
system, thus gaining access. 8' By "impersonation," the user
gains access through the use of the identity of an
authorized user, usually through improper acquisition of
their password,"9  identification card or passkey.310
management systems consultant at SRI International and the author of the
book COMPUTER SECURITY MANAGEMENT). "No computer system can ever be risk-
free if for no other reason than its ultimate reliance upon humans who are
error-prone, fallible, and amenable to corruption." Id. at 74.
304. See generally PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY,
SOCIAL VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995); Jon Jefferson, Deleting Cybercrook:
Prosecutors Want Tough Laws to Put Internet Hackers, Scam Artists and
Pedophiles on Permanent Log Off, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 72; How Ethical
Hackers Pinpoint Security Weaknesses: In the Struggle to Protect Computer
Systems Against Unauthorized Access, Companies Worldwide Spend More Than
$6bn a Year on Security Expertise, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Sept. 3, 1997, at
01 (describing the increased use of computer crime as a means of making a
living). A study conducted in 1992 by USA Research Inc. revealed that the
number of "unauthorized intrusions" to computers in the U.S. workplace
increased from 339,000 in 1989 to 684,000 in 1991. Wade Roush, Hackers:
Taking a Byte out of Computer Crime, MASS. INST. OF TECH. ALUMNI ASS'N TECH.
REV., April 1995, at 32.
305. See Fred W. Weingarten, Information Technology and Privacy Trends
in Products and Services, in INVITED PAPERS ON PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS AND
TECHNOLOGY, 15, 23 (1981).
306. LINOWES, supra note 184, at 70. A 16-year-old British hacker known as
the 'Datastream Cowboy" used a $1200 computer to gain access to military data
in the Air Force's Rome Laboratory, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, and
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. See J. Scott Orr, Hacking Their Way Into
Our Lives, THE PLAIN DEALER, July 13, 1997, at 1E.
307. See LINOWES, supra note 184, at 73.
308. Id.
309. If an individual leaves her computer station without exiting the
program she is working on, a hacker can simply sit down at that computer and
continue usage. This is known as "hijacking" a password. See Graeme
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"Superzapping" occurs when an individual uses a universal
access program, normally only used in case of emergency, to
break into a system.3" Finally, a person may use a
"trapdoor" to gain entry."' These are simplified means of
entry created by the systems designer which often operate
on the basis of a password.313 By combining these methods,
among others, computer hackers 14 or crackers315 enjoy a
high rate of success for information access-nearly 66%--
and are able to avoid detection 99% of the time.1 6
Unfortunately, records kept by the United States
government are no more secure than any other
computerized record.3 In December 1994, hackers gained
access to the U.S. Naval Academy's computer systems,
causing "considerable disruptions to the academy's ability
to process and store sensitive information." ' 8 During the
following two years, an Argentinean hacker penetrated the
computers at the Naval Research Laboratory, NASA and
Los Alamos National Laboratory, along with other sites
belonging to the Department of Defense." Prior to the Gulf
War, Dutch hackers broke into the computer records held at
thirty-four U.S. military sites, discovering locations of U.S.
troops, data on the Patriot missile, and information
concerning the movement of American warships, which
Browning, Hack Attacks, NAT'L J. GOV'T ExECUTIVE, Aug. 1997, at 23.
310. See LINOWES, supra note 184, at 73.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See id.
314. According to the Free On-Line Dictionary of Computing, 'hacker" is
defined as "1. A person who enjoys exploring the details of programmable
systems and how to stretch their capabilities, as opposed to most users, who
prefer to learn only the minimum necessary."
<http'//wagner.princeton.edu/foldoc/ogi-script?query=hacker> (Dec. 1, 1994) (on
file with Buffalo Law Review).
315. The term cracker refers to those who break into computer systems with
the purpose of stealing data or vandalizing. See Maria O'Daniel, Lab Report
Resources: Hacking, Cracking and Phreaking, COmPUTIMEs (Malaysia), Dec. 11,
1997, at 54. Cracker has been defined as "A malicious meddler who tries to
discover sensitive information by poking around."
<http://wagner.princeton.edu/foldoc/ogi-script?query=hacker> (Dec. 1, 1994) (on
file with Buffalo Law Review).
316. See Jefferson, supra note 304.
317. See generally Browning, supra note 308, at 23; see also Orr, supra note
305, at 1E.
318. Browning, supra note 308, at 23.
319. See id.
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they then attempted to give to Iraq. ° Hackers have also
gained access to web sites belonging to the Air Force and
NASA.32 1
Records kept by the Department of Defense are
particularly difficult to protect from attack. A 1996 study by
the General Accounting Office calculated that in 1995, the
Defense Department's computers might have been broken
into as many as 250,000 times, and the number of break-ins
in 1996 could be twice that.2  The high incidence of success
among hackers targeting the DoD may be linked to DoD
problems training staff members to operate its computer
network.23 The DoD often cannot match salaries offered to
network personnel in the private sector, and thus lose a
good number of their valuable employees. Moreover,
members of the military staff rotate job assignments every
two to four years, creating a situation in which a great deal
of time must be spent training new personnel to set up and
maintain the DoD networks.2
Thus it would appear that access to the electronic
databases connected to the DoD DNA Repository may not,
in reality, be as "strictly limited" as the military contends.
Potentially, a third-party employer could illegally gain
access to computerized files, with a mere 1% risk of
320. See id.
321. See id.; see also O'Daniel, supra note 315, at 54. In August of that year,
the web site for the Department of Justice had to be shut down at 2:45 a.m.
after hackers replaced the picture of the Attorney General with that of Adolf
Hitler and changed the Department's name to the Department of Injustice. See
id.; see also Alan Paller, Avoiding Attacks, NATL J. GOV'T ExEcuTivE, Aug. 1997,
at 26. The hackers who gained access to the CIA Web site changed the agency's
posted name to the "Central Stupidity Agency," added obscenities to the page,
and linked the site to one belonging to Playboy magazine. [Prepared statement
of Sen. Patrick Leahy before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on
Technology, Terrorism and Gov't, Information. Subject-Internet Crimes
Affecting Consumers, Mar. 19, 1997, Fed. News Service].
322. See Stephen Green, Hackers Penetrate Pentagon in "Catalog of
Horrors," CoPLEY NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 13, 1997. It is interesting to note that the
General Accounting Office has also estimated that hackers successfully
infiltrate (meaning actually access secured information) Pentagon computers
160,000 times a year. See id.
323. See Sami Lais, DoD Looks Forward to the Day It Can Replace Its
Communications Tangle With a Sleek, Secure Network, GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS,
Oct. 13, 1997, at 49.
324. See id.
325. See id.
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detection. 26 In addition, a third-party could access records
on her own and sell the information to potential
employers,32 7 or an authorized user could leak information
from the DNA Repository to possible employers. 28 Such
problems are only likely to arise, however, if the genetic
information contained in the DoD DNA Repository stored
electronically in the future. If the government takes no such
action, the potential harm to service members is minimal.
In addition, even if genetic information is electronically
stored, hacking into the DoD's database is an illegal
activity. One would suspect that employers would not
engage in such activities, even if the chances of being
detected are small, since harsh punishment upon detection
is certain. The possibility that an employer might purchase
genetic information stolen from the DoD DNA Repository
might be more realistic, but is no less speculative. As a
result, one must conclude that the possibility that a civilian
employer could use the information contained in the DoD
DNA Repository to discriminate against a service member,
though it exists, is rather low.
B. The Military as Employer
The military is one of the largest employers in the
nation,"' and its health system is one of the largest in the
world, covering more than eight million individuals."' As
such, the DoD spends thirty-two billion dollars each year
for health care costs, a financial burden greater than that
326. See Jefferson, supra note 304.
327. See Lais, supra note 323, at 49. ("Information brokers pay other
hackers to steal information, then they resell it."). This may have already
happened, being that illegal entry into DoD files is undiscovered 99% of the
time. See Jefferson, supra note 304; see also Michael Landau, Use of Genetic
Testing by Employers and Insurance Companies, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & PoLy
105 (1994) (imagining that some sort of "insider trading" in genetic information
could arise in the future).
328. See generally Allen, supra note 300. At present, there exists a black
market for medical information in which just about any person's medical
records can be purchased for approximately $250. See id. Leaking of medical
information is particularly problematic because security measures apparently
cannot prevent it from happening. See id.
329. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Monica Gallagher,
Symposium, The Tools of Title VII Enforcement, Then and Now, 26 PAC. L.J.
791, 799 (1995).
330. See Rudy de Leon, Funding for Defense Health Programs,
CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, Sept. 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL 18088653.
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borne by any private employer in the United States."'1
Providing health care has been particularly difficult for the
military because, while health care costs increase, the
DoD's budget has been targeted for cuts since the end of the
Cold War."' Officials at the Pentagon indicated that
diminishing military resources have affected nearly every
aspect of military performance, "from cuts in training to
shortages of parts for fighter jets to the gap between
military and civilian pay." ' As a result, officials fear that
the ability of the military to engage in and win a war, what
is commonly referred to as "military readiness," could be
compromised. 34
Cutting military health care costs could provide
additional funds for the military to improve its overall
readiness. The military's financial incentives to eliminate or
exclude service members who could become susceptible to
genetic disease are thus similar to the incentives of third-
party employers.3 5 However, in addition to this financial
motive, the military possesses the means by which such
adverse selection could be carried out-the genetic records
of every service member in the Marines, Air Force, Army,
and Navy. Through genetic screening, the military could
eliminate individuals who are prone to the development of
genetically-linked diseases, thus taking preventative
measures to control health care costs.336
No federal law prevents the U.S. military from
engaging in such genetic discrimination against a
331. See Vets' Panel Key Findings, USA TODAY, Jan. 14, 1999, at 12A; Bill
McAllister, More Aid to Veterans Urged; Panel Says College Should Be Free,
CHi. SuN-TIMES, Jan. 15, 1999, at 29. It would cost $462 million over a five year
period to finance these additional health care services. See id. See generally de
Leon, supra note 330. Recently, a Congressionally appointed committee
proposed that the Pentagon pay health care costs for military personnel and
their families for up to eighteen months after personnel are discharged.
332. See generally Steven Lee Myers, Military Feeling Budget Crunch,
Clinton Warned, Brass Tells Him of Shortages, Pay Gap, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Sept. 16, 1998, at Al.
333. Id.
334. See id.
335. See Allen, supra note 300, at 10-11.
336. See Gill, supra note 12, at 210 ("The military could conceivably use its
DNA registry to identify members who might have health risks or who might
develop diseases rendering them no longer physically qualified").
Screening would also serve another military purpose-that of military
effectiveness. By excluding individuals who may be more prone to illness, the
military could select a physically superior fighting force.
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uniformed service member because courts have continually
refused to extend statutory remedies available to civilians
to uniformed members of the armed forces without direction
from Congress to do so.117 Thus, the Rehabilitation Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act offer service personnel no protection from
discriminatory action taken by the military.
Section 2000e(b) of Title VII defines employer as any
"person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks."38 However, the military is not
recognized as an employer amenable to suit brought under
Title VII by a uniformed service member.339 Rather, suits
brought by uniformed members of the armed services fall
under the general "military exception" grounded in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16, which states: "All personnel actions
affecting employees or applicants for employment... in
military departments as defined in § 102 of Title 5 ... shall
be made free from any discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex or national origin."3
40
The question regarding whether uniformed members of
the military service may bring suit against the government
under Title VII for any employment related discrimination
focuses upon the interpretation of the words "employees...
in military departments" found in the above-mentioned
section. In Johnson v. Alexander, the Eighth Circuit held
that an applicant for enlistment in the armed services could
not bring suit under Title VII.341 In so deciding, the Court
emphasized that uniformed members of the armed services
differ from ordinary civilian employees in the military,
337. See Coffman v. Michigan, 120 F.3d 57 (6th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Garrett,
903 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1990); Milbert v. Koop, 830 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Roper v. Department of the Army, 832 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1987); Gonzalez v.
Department of the Army, 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Alexander,
572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1977).
338. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
339. See Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Garrett, 903
F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1990), Roper v. Department of the Army, 832 F.2d 247 (2d
Cir. 1987); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981).
340. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-16 (1994); see also Gonzalez v. Dept. of the Army,
718 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1983)("[N]either Title VII nor its standards are
applicable to persons who enlisted of apply for enlistment in any of the armed
forces of the United States."); Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th
Cir. 1978).
341. 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978).
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mentioning that an enlisted service member cannot quit his
job, that the armed services cannot simply fire a service
member, and that the service member is subject to both
military discipline and military law.34 The Court concluded
that uniformed service members would not be considered
"employees... in military departments," but that phrase
would be construed to include civilian employees in the
military.
3 43
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
Gonzalez v. Department of Army by focusing on the
statutory definition of military departments. 34 Section 102
of Title 5, referred to in Section 2000e-16 of Title VII,
defines military departments as: "The Departments of the
Army[;] The Department of the Navy[; and] The
Department of the Air Force."345 Section 101 of Title 10,346 as
referenced in the historical and revision note to 5 U.S.C. §
102, contains a definition of military departments
substantially similar to that found in 5 U.S.C. § 102.
However, section 101 also provides a distinct definition for
"armed forces," stating that " 'Armed Forces' means the
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard."
3 48
The Court concluded that because Congress used separate
definitions for military departments and armed forces,
Congress intended that the former refer to a department
consisting of civilian employees, while the latter is a body
consisting of uniformed military personnel. 349 The "military
departments" language in Title VII therefore applies solely
to civilian employees in military departments, rather than
to any uniformed service members seeking to bring a Title
VII cause of action against the government.350 Thus, no
uniformed member of the armed forces could bring a claim
against the military under Title VII for use of genetic
information in a manner which disparately impacts
individuals of a particular race, sex, religion, or national
origin.
342. See id. at 1223-24.
343. Id.
344. 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1983).
345. 5 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
346. 10 U.S.C. § 101(7) (1994).
347. 5 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
348. 10 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1994).
349. See Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928.
350. Id.
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The courts' refusal to allow uniformed service members
to bring a cause of action against the military under the
Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act is
an extension of the rationales found in Johnson and
Gonzalez,351 as well as reasoning utilized by the Supreme
Court in Chappell v. Wallace.352 In Chappell, the Court held
that soldiers could not bring a Bivens"5 action against their
superiors for damages stemming from alleged racial
discrimination in violation of their constitutional rights.5 4
The Court noted that: "The special status of the military
has required, the Constitution has contemplated, Congress
has created, and this court has long recognized two systems
of justice, to some extent parallel: one for civilians and one
for military personnel."3" Since Congress has plenary
authority over the military, any interference by thejudiciary with matters connected to military life would be
inappropriate.356 So, just as courts declined to extend a
remedy to uniformed members of the armed forces for
discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, or national
origin absent authorization by Congress," courts likewise
refused to allow uniformed service members to bring claims
under the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with
Disabilities Act for discrimination on the basis of
disability.358
351. Coffman, 120 F.3d at 59.
352. 462 U.S. 296.
353. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that governmental employees may be sued in their
individual capacity).
354. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303-04.
355. Id. at 303-04.
356. See id. at 304. See Coffman, 120 F.3d at 59, for a discussion of the
Chappell case, as it relates to the denial of a remedy for uniformed members of
the armed forces under Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
357. See notes 341-50 and accompanying text.
358. See Coffman, 120 F.3d at 59 (holding that a national guard member
released from military service due to his inability to complete a two-mile run
within the time required by Army fitness standards had no remedy for
disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act or
Rehabilitation Act since he was a uniformed member of the armed forces);
Garrett, 903 F.2d at 1461 (holding that an asymptomatic HIV-positive naval
reserve member had no cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act for
disability discrimination since the Rehabilitation Act doesn't apply to uniformed
military personnel); Smith, 763 F.2d at 1325 (holding that an applicant for a
commission as an officer in the U.S. Naval Reserve, Medical Service Corps,
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Without any laws to proscribe genetic discrimination,
no legal deterrent exists to prevent the military from
engaging in discriminatory acts. To the contrary, the
military is one of the few employers in the United States
who may engage in discriminatory practices with little or no
interference from the judiciary. This situation exists
because the United States Constitution grants Congress
express authority to "raise and support Armies... , [t]o
provide and maintain a Navy... [t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces."36  In addition to recognizing Congressional
authority over the military, many courts are reluctant to
interfere with the " 'strong historical' tradition supporting
'the military establishment's broad power to deal with its
own personnel' " since they consider themselves incapable
of acting in a realm dominated by military experts."' As a
result, courts give great judicial deference to Congress
when addressing military rules or policies.36
could not bring an action under the Rehabilitation Act for disability
discrimination on the basis of a missing right index finger).
359. See MELISSA WELLS-PETRY, EXCLUSION: HOMOSEXUALS AND THE RIGHT
TO SERVE 5 (1993); Sam Nunn, The Fundamental Principles of the Supreme
Court's Jurisprudence in Military Cases, 1995 ARMY LAW. 27, 28.
360. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, c. 12-14.
361. John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a
Balance Between Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REV. 303,
309 (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 181, 187 (1962)). The courts' "hands-off" attitude when dealing with the
military was expressed in Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953), when the
Court stated:
[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army .... The military
constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that
of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous
not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous
not to intervene in judicial matters.
Id. at 93-94. Similarly, the court stated in Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1
(1973),
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the
courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as
to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are
essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of
the Legislative and Executive Branches.
Id. at 10. See also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983); Goldman, 475
U.S. at 507.
362. See Kathryn R. Burke, The Privacy Penumbra and Adultery: Does
Military Necessity Justify an Adultery Regulation and What Will It Take for the
Court to Declare It Unconstitutional?, 19 HAMLInE J. PUB. L. & POLY 301, 321
(1997); see also Simmons, supra note 13, at 26.
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The military thus may adopt practices on the basis of
military necessity even though such practices would be
considered discriminatory if engaged in by employers in the
private sector in absence of business necessity."3 As
explained by author Melissa Wells-Petry, a Major in the
U.S. Army,
all military personnel policies discriminate.... For example, the
military excludes- "discriminates against"-single parents,
felons, handicapped individuals, transsexuals, conscientious
objectors, and persons with any of a number of medical conditions.
The military also discriminates on the basis of height and weight,
physical and mental ability, visual acuity, political beliefs and
religious affiliation, language, youth and age. To repeat--all
military personnel policies discriminate.... And these
discriminatory judgments are made by Congress, by the Secretary
of Defense, or by the service secretaries in fulfilling their duty to
compose strong, combat-ready, and efficiently administered armed
forces.36
The military developed these restrictions to improve
"overall combat effectiveness."365 The circumstances which
the restrictions target are not linked to the ability of
military personnel to perform any job in particular366 and
need not be tailored as such due to the courts' "extreme
deference to the military bordering on non-justiciability ... ,36 7 Provided that the military argues the
existence of military necessity, whether due to the need for
363. See e.g. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that the
military may refuse to alter uniform dress regulations to allow the wearing of a
yarmulke because military necessity outweighs protections available under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment); Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455
(11th Cir. 1990) (upholding military exclusion for HIV seropositivity); Smith v.
Christian, 763 F.2d 1322 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the exclusion of an
applicant from military service because he lacked a finger was permissible);
Blameuser v. Andrews, 630 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1980) (upholding exclusion of
cadet from Reserve Officer Training Corps for adherence to nazism); Williams v.
United States, 541 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D.N.C 1982) (upholding discharge of
Marine for being weighing fifty pounds more than military weight standards).
364. WELLS-PETRY, supra note 359, at 5. See also Nunn, supra note 359, at
28 ("The armed forces routinely restrict the opportunities for service on the
basis of circumstances such as physical condition, age, sex, parental status,
educational background, medical history, and mental aptitude.").
365. Nunn, supra note 359, at 28.
366. See id.
367. C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The
Military and Other "Special Contexts," 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 779 (1988).
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preparedness or the need to maintain discipline, courts will
refrain from passing judgment upon military practices. 8
Many of the restrictions which the military imposes
upon service personnel are in fact justified by military
necessity. Indeed, when national defense is at issue,
military necessity dictates that individuals in combat
positions can perform physical tasks such as being able to
carry weapons or injured peers. Some military restrictions,
however, may in reality be based more upon military
preference than military necessity. For example, since the
First World War, the military has used personnel
regulations and military laws proscribing sodomy to
prevent homosexuals from serving in the military." In
1993, President Clinton's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
created a system in which any service member who engages
in, or attempts or intends to engage in, homosexual acts
shall be discharged from the armed forces.37 ° In addition,
individuals who indicate that they are homosexual are
discharged from the military unless they rebut the
presumption that they will engage in homosexual acts while
in the military."' The military necessity upon which this
policy is founded is usually described as the necessity of
maintaining unit cohesion."2 Army Chief of Staff General
Gordon R. Sullivan annunciated this concern in 1993:
"cohesion is enhanced by uniformity, by adherence to a
common sense of values and behavior. The introduction into
any small unit of a person whose open orientation and self-
definition is diametrically opposed to the rest of the group
will cause tension and disruption."373 However, a RAND
368. See e.g. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) ("The fundamental
necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of
discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be
constitutionally impermissible outside it."). See generally Burke, supra note
362, at 332; Dienes, supra note 367, at 799.
369. See RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SEXUAL ORIEN-
TATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY: OPTIONS AND ASSESSMENT 3
(1993) [hereinafter RAND STUDY].
370. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (Supp. 1994); see also Henry Weinstein, Appeals
Court Backs Military Policy, Upholds Discharge of Two Gay Men, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 1997, at A25.
371. See id.
372. See Elizabeth Kier, Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integra-
tion and Combat Effectiveness, 23 INT'L SECURITY 5 (1998).
373. See id. at 5. For a more extensive discussion of unit cohesion, see
RAND STUDY, supra note 369, at 283-329.
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study conducted at the request of the Secretary of Defense
and completed in 1993 revealed that, although senior
military leaders expressed great fear that unit cohesion
would be ruined by the allowance of homosexuals in the
military, any disruption of unit cohesion was likely to be
minimalY. Thus, it would appear that the military
necessity of maintaining unit cohesion may not truly justify
military policies against homosexuals. Nevertheless, courts
which have been asked to address the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy have deferred to Congress for reasons
previously explained rather than examining the military's
rationale. 75
The U.S. military used an argument of military
necessity to maintain racial discrimination in the armed
forces. 37' Throughout the early part of the twentieth
century, a number of military leaders held the opinion that
the elimination of racial segregation in the military would
jeopardize unit cohesion and performance.377 Opponents to
integration argued that it would "create personal tensions
and social divisions that would distract military personnel,
disrupt work, and perhaps lead to violence.... [It would]
undermine unit cohesion among the troops and thereby
impair their morale, readiness, and ability to perform as a
unified combat force."378 Interestingly, it was the true
military necessity in the winter of 1944-1945 due to
infantry troop shortages in Europe that arose which caused
General Eisenhower to order integrated combat training for
black and white service members. 79 Field reports indicated
that neither racial violence nor lack of cooperation arose in
integrated combat situations.380
The fact that the United States military has used the
concept of military necessity to justify discriminatory
374. See RAND STUDY, supra note 369, at 329-30. Examiners based this
conclusion upon analysis of unit cohesion in fire departments, police
departments, and foreign militaries in which homosexuals were allowed to
serve. See id.
375. See e.g. Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 636 (2d Cir. 1998)
(reversing a district court holding that one section of 10 U.S.C. § 654 was
unconstitutional and emphasizing that the court could not substitute its own
judgment for that of Congress).
376. See RAND STUDY, supra note 369, at 20.
377. See id. at 171.
378. Id. at 172.
379. See id. at 173.
380. See id.
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practices in instances when no necessity exists raises the
question whether the military might use DNA Repository
records to engage in genetic discrimination on the basis of
"military necessity." The denial of Title VII protections for
service members and judicial deference to Congress
regarding military rules and policies create a situation in
which the military is granted license to discriminate. In
addition, the military has engaged in genetic discrimination
in the past when dealing with the sickle cell trait."'
Sickle cell disease is a term used to describe a family of
inherited red blood cell disorders which include sickle cell
anemia, sickle cell disease, and sickle B Thalassaemia82 and
which predominantly appear among individuals of African
descent. 83 A person with sickle cell disease is at risk of
suffering a medical crisis in which her red blood cells
"sickle" by distorting into a crescent shape."' When this
occurs, the misshapen cells can block the flow of blood
through small blood vessels, thereby causing oxygen
deprivation and tissue damage in some organ systems.
However, the disease will manifest itself only if an
individual inherits the genetic trait for sickle cell anemia
from both parents.8 6 In 1994, approximately 60,000
individuals in the United States possessed sickle cell
disease.87
If an individual inherits a single sickle cell gene from a
parent, he will develop sickle cell trait rather than sickle
cell disease,388 and will not ordinarily experience any
sickling crisis."8' Sickle cell trait is not a disease; carriers of
381. See DAVID SUZUKI & PETER KNUDTSON, GENETHICS: THE ETHICS OF
ENGINEERING LIFE 145 (1990); Richard Severo, Air Academy to Drop its Ban on
Applicants with Sickle-Cell Gene, NEW YORK TIMEs, Feb. 4, 1981, at Al; Dean,
supra note 3, at 23.
382. See KENNY MIDENCE & JAMES ELANDER, SICKLE CELL DISEASE: A
PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACH 5 (1994).
383. See Sickle Disease Research: An Update: Hearing of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong. 39 (1994) [hereinafter Sickle
Disease Hearing]; Douglas Birch, Genetic Tests Forecast Onset of Inherited
Medical Disorders, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, May 20, 1995, at E5.
384. See MIDENCE & ELANDER, supra note 382, at 5.
385. See id.
386. See Birch, supra note 383, at E5; Air Force Academy Sued Over Sickle
Cell Policy, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 4, 1981, at 20 [hereinafter Academy Sued].
387. See Sickle Disease Hearing, supra note 383, at 39.
388. See MIDENCE & ELANDER, supra note 382, at 14; Birch, supra note 383,
at E5.
389. See Gostin, supra note 163, at 118; Birch, supra note 383, at E5 ("[A]
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the trait do not require treatment for this trait, nor will
they develop medical problems related to the trait as they
age. 9' In other words, most carriers of this genetic trait are
completely asymptomatic and remain so throughout their
lives since a majority of their red blood cells function
normally. 9' However, sickling can occur under certain
extreme conditions, such as strenuous physical exercise at a
high altitude or flying at a high altitude in an
unpressurized plane.39 Approximately 2.5 million people in
the United States have this "healthy carrier" type of sickle
cell.3
93
In 1972, two black cadets at the Air Force Academy
became ill after undergoing survival training at elevations
of over 7000 feet. 94 The Air Force linked the cadets' illness
to the fact that they possessed the sickle cell trait,395 and
feared that carriers of the sickle cell trait might have
reduced oxygen-carrying ability when flying at high
altitudes during pilot training.396 This event spurred the Air
Force Academy to implement a policy under which every
applicant possessing sickle cell trait would be denied
admittance to the Academy, 97 despite the fact that the Air
Force did not at that time have "adequate scientific
evidence to substantiate its concerns." 93 The exclusionary
policy was enacted in 1973 and maintained for eight
years.99 In 1981, the Air Force Academy finally decided to
drop the ban after " 'more and more medical knowledge
became available' to indicate that the policy was really notjustified by available scientific facts."00
few people with the trait have an elevated risk of developing blood clots in the
leg and elsewhere. But 98 percent of people with the single gene suffer no
health effects."); Richard Severo, Air Academy to Drop Its Ban on Applicants
With Sickle-Cell Gene, NEW YORK TIMEs, Feb. 4, 1981, at Al (stating that the
trait is "generally regarded as harmless"). But see Susan Okie, Sickle-Cell Trait
Poses Exertion Risk: Increase in Chance of Sudden Death Seen, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 24, 1987, at A3.
390. See MIDENCE & ELANDER, supra note 382, at 14.
391. See SuzuKI & KNUDTSON, supra note 381, at 144.
392. See id. at 145.
393. See Sickle Disease Hearing, supra note 383, at 39.
394. See Severo, supra note 389, at Al.
395. See id.
396. See SUZuKI & KNUDTSON, supra note 381, at 145.
397. See Severo, supra note 389, at Al.
398. SUZUKI & KNUDTSON, supra note 381, at 145.
399. See id.; Severo, supra note 389, at Al; Chadwin, supra note 2, at 23.
400. Chadwin, supra note 2, at 23..
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The Academy's sickle cell trait policy disproportionately
affected black students because both sickle cell disease and
the sickle cell trait occur predominantly among individuals
of African descent.4"' In fact, approximately five incoming
black cadets were excluded from the Academy during each
year that the policy was in effect.4"2 Since possession of a
genetic trait does not predict any current or future illness,
the Air Force Academy was excluding individuals based
upon the manner in which their genetic map differed from
the "normal" genome, °3 thereby engaging in genetic
discrimination.
Such genetic discrimination in the military could
forseeably happen again. If it did occur, no uniformed
member of the armed forces could successfully bring an
action against the military under Title VII, the
Rehabilitation Act, or the Americans with Disabilities
Act.0 4 This absence of protection against discrimination for
service members, in combination with the history of
discrimination in the Armed Forces, suggest that Mayfield
and Vlacovsky's fears regarding the potential for
discriminatory action by the military through adverse use
of information contained in the DoD DNA Repository may
be a valid concern. The potential for harm does exist.
Although the chances that such harm will actually occur
may be labeled by a court as a "speculative contingency,"
this contingency may not be more speculative than the
interest which military has in the identification of human
remains through DNA analysis.0 5
CONCLUSION
The DoD's policy of mandatory DNA collection is one
which is likely to be challenged again. Before this happens,
it is essential that Congress expand the coverage of the civil
rights laws to include the prohibition of genetic
discrimination, that states continue to pass laws
proscribing genetic discrimination in employment, and that
Congress adopt a new policy which would allow the
401. See generally Gill, supra note 12, at 201; Gostin, supra note 163, at 139.
402. See Academy Sued, supra note 386, at 20.
403. See Billings, et al., supra note 167, at 477.
404. See supra notes 195-259 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 105-52 and accompanying text.
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justiciary to examine the necessity of mandatory DNA
collection from all service members and recruits.
In applying the Skinner balancing test, the District
Court of Hawaii examined whether the government
possessed a compelling interest in the identification of
remains in general. Once this broad category was selected,
the court's conclusion was foregone-the fact that the
government has a compelling interest in the identification
of remains is undisputed. However, the issue which should
have been addressed in Mayfield and must be addressed by
the legislature is whether the DoD has a compelling
interest in the identification of remains by DNA analysis
when the DNA is obtained through a mandatory collection
policy.
By failing to examine the government's necessity, the
District Court of Hawaii failed to discover that the
government does not possess a compelling interest in the
mandatory collection of DNA from service members because
it did not consider any of the following factors: (1) that the
United States is enjoying a time of peace during which a
service member's estimated chances of survival are
99.998%, °0 (2) that traditional means of remains
identification are still viable,4 7 (3) that contaminated DNA
can lead to misidentification or render positive
identification impossible,48 and (4) that DNA identification
could be carried out by using DNA voluntarily supplied by
family members of the deceased.4 9 In addition, when the
court took up the other half of the Skinner test, and
examined the degree of intrusion upon the marines' privacy
rights, any of Mayfield's and Vlacovsky's fears regarding
future discriminatory action were labeled nonjusticiable
and hastily set aside.4 0 First, the District Court never
explored the likelihood that genetic information catalogued
in the DNA Repository could be used by private sector
employers for adverse purposes. It is true that such a
discussion would call for speculation. However, the
speculative contingencies of future genetic discrimination
may not be nearly as speculative as portrayed by the
406. See supra Part III.A.
407. See supra Part III.B.
408. See supra Part III. C.
409. See supra Part III. D.
410. See Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp 300, 304 (D. Haw. 1995).
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District Court of Hawaii. Moreover, when compared to the
military's actual need to use the DNA it collects and stores
for identification purposes, the actual necessity of the
government to collect and store DNA sample of every
service member may be even more speculative than the
possibility of harm to service members. Computer records in
the DoD DNA Repository are not fully secured against
unauthorized entry.41' If genetic information is stored
electronically and improperly accessed, employers of service
members or former service members are only precluded
from using genetic information in employment decisions in
fourteen states.41  No federal legislation specifically
proscribes genetic discrimination.413 A potential for harm
exists and merits consideration.
Secondly, and more importantly, the military as
employer engages in discriminatory practices.414 Service
members are barred from bringing employment
discrimination claims against the government under Title
VII, the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.415 If it wished, the
military could forseeably initiate a program of genetic
screening to control increasing health care costs and justify
such discrimination by claiming that it is dictated by
military necessity. The potential for harm exists.
When the Human Genome Project is complete, project
participants expect that all three billion bases in the human
genome will be identified.416 "The more genes that can be
identified and understood-the higher the resolution of the
map-the clearer the steps to prevention or cure. But by the
same token, the more information that genes yield to...
employers, the more they can make people vulnerable to
discrimination."1 The DoD DNA Registry is expected to
contain over 2.5 million specimens by 2001,4" any one of
which could be improperly accessed. Until adequate
411. See supra Part III.A.6.
412. See supra Part III.A.4.
413. See supra Parts IV.A.1 to A.3.
414. See supra Part IV.B.
415. See supra notes 338-59 and accompanying text.
416. See Advances in Genetics Research and Technologies: Challenges for
Public Policy: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, 104th Cong. 46 (1995) (testimony of Francis S. Collins, M.D.).
417. Allen, supra note 300, at 35.
418. SIMMONS, supra note 13, at 35 (stating that approximately 2.5 million
service members are in the military each year, and the turn-over rate in the
military is 200,000 to 300,000 individuals per year).
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safeguards are implemented by Congress, service members
are in fact vulnerable to discrimination.
